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ABSTRACT
Essays in Structural Econometrics of Auctions
Seda Bülbül Toklu
The rst chapter of this thesis gives a detailed picture of commonly used struc-
tural estimation techniques for several types of auction models. Next chapters consist
of essays in which these techniques are utilized for empirical analysis of auction envi-
ronments. In the second chapter we discuss the identication and estimation of the
distribution of private signals in a common value auction model with an asymmet-
ric information environment. We argue that the private information of the informed
bidders are identiable due to the asymmetric information structure. Then, we pro-
pose a two stage estimation method, which follows the identication strategy. We
show, with Monte-Carlo experiments, that the estimator performs well. Third chapter
studies Outer Continental Shelf drainage auctions, where oil and gas extraction leases
are sold. Informational asymmetry across bidders and collusive behavior of informed
rms make this environment very unique. We apply the technique proposed in the
second chapter to data from the OCS drainage auctions. We estimate the parame-
ters of a structural model and then run counterfactual simulations to see the e¤ects
of the informational asymmetry on the governments auction revenue. We nd that
the probability that information symmetry brings higher revenue to the government
increases with the value of the auctioned tract.
In the fourth chapter, we make use of the results in the multi-unit auction liter-
ature to study the Balancing Energy Services auctions (electricity spot market auc-
tions) in Texas. We estimate the marginal costs of bidders implied by the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model of the market. We then compare
the estimates to the actual marginal cost data. We nd that, for the BES auction
we study, the three largest bidders, Luminant, NRG and Calpine, have marked-down
their bids more than the optimal amount implied by the model for the quantities
where they were short of their contractual obligations, while they have put a mark-
up larger than the optimal level implied by the model for quantities in excess of their
contract obligations. Among the three bidders we studied, Calpine has come closest
to bidding its optimal implied by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit
auction model of the BES market.
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Introduction
Auctions have been used widely as a sale format since antique ages. From govern-
ment procurement to used car sales they are employed prevalently across the world.
With the advent of online marketplaces like eBay and Amazon consumers from all
segments have come to use this sale mechanism. Their broad use and high trade vol-
umes have made auctions an interesting research area for economists. Since the paper
by Vickrey (1961) the topic has gained more and more attention, and been analyzed
in many di¤erent frameworks. Their relatively isolated environment and data avail-
ability have also made auctions an attractive eld to test predictions of game theoretic
models. Structural econometric papers in this area have come to the scene following
Paarsch (1992). Estimating unknown value distribution of bidders helps researchers
to conduct several interesting policy analyses by counterfactual experiments. Several
di¤erent identication results and estimation ways have been proposed for alterna-
tive environments. Athey and Haile (2007) provides a comprehensive summary of
this literature. The rst chapter also takes a similar role and gives a detailed picture
of commonly used structural estimation techniques for various auction types and dif-
ferent environments. The analyses in the following chapters are conducted based on
some of the methods and results listed in the rst chapter.
More specically, in the second chapter, we discuss the identication and estima-
tion of the distribution of private values in a common value auction model with an
1
2asymmetric information structure. This study builds on the results in identication
and structural estimation of rst price auctions, which are summarized in section 1
of the rst chapter. We argue that the private values of the informed bidder is iden-
tiable due to the asymmetric information structure. Then, we propose a two stage
estimation method, which follows the identication strategy. Third chapter studies
Outer Continental Shelf auctions, where oil and gas extraction leases are sold. In-
formational asymmetry across bidders and collusive behavior of more informed rms
make this environment very unique. We apply the technique proposed in the second
chapter to data from the OCS auctions. We estimate the parameters of a structural
model and then run counterfactual simulations to see the e¤ects of the informational
asymmetry on the governments auction revenue. We nd that, the probability that
information symmetry brings higher revenue to the government increases with the
value of the auctioned tract. In the fourth chapter, we make use of the results in
the multi-unit auction literature to study the Balancing Energy Services auctions
(electricity spot market auctions) in Texas.We adopt the multi-unit auction model of
BES studied in Hortacsu and Puller (2008). We release their assumption of additively
separable supply schedules and estimate the marginal costs of bidders implied by a
multi-unit auction model of the market. We then compare the estimates to the actual
marginal cost data. We nd that, for the BES auction we study, the three largest
bidders, Luminant, NRG and Calpine, have marked-down their bids more than the
optimal amount implied by the model for the quantities where they were short of their
contractual obligations, while they have put a mark-up larger than the optimal level
implied by the model for quantities in excess of their contract obligations. Among the
3three bidders we studied, Calpine has come closest to bidding its optimal implied by
the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model of the BES market.
CHAPTER 1
A Survey on Econometrics of Auctions1
1.1. First Price Auctions
1.1.1. First Price Unit Demand Auctions
Most of the sales that involve state as a buyer or seller are in the form of rst price
auctions. The most common examples for those include highway procurement, oil and
gas extraction leases, and timber sales. Having a sample of similar auctions researcher
can do structural analysis to answer policy questions.
The literature in structural econometrics of auctions began in 90s with the analy-
sis of rst price auctions. Early papers in the area include Donald and Paarsch (1993)
and La¤ont et al. (1995). The former studies a classical problem in maximum likeli-
hood estimation of structural auction models. In general, the distribution of bidders
valuations is estimated having a sample of bidding data from similar auctions, and
the support of the distribution depends on the parameters to be estimated. This
violates the application of standard asymptotics to the estimates, a major problem in
maximum likelihood estimation. To tackle this problem they propose a Piece-wise
Pseudo Likelihoodestimator and derived its asymptotic properties. Their estima-
tion method , however, is parametric and requires the computation of the nonlinear
bid function which might be cumbersome for some parameterization. To solve this
1This chapter is a version of the online appendix to Hasker and Sickles (2010).
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5problem Guerre et al. (2000) proposes a nonparametric estimation technique where
they do not need to compute the bid function, and instead they use the rst order
condition to get pseudo values for the bidders. In the second stage they estimate
biddersvalue distribution from these pseudo values nonparametrically. They then
extend their method to capture auction covariates and reserve prices. All these papers
assume independent private values for bidders which provide simpler bid functions
than those in common value models where bidders have imperfect signals about the
value of the item being auctioned prior to sale. The asymmetry in bidderssignals
causes what is known as the winners curseproblem. The bidder knows that if she
becomes the winner, she will be the one with the most optimistic signal. Therefore,
the bidder updates her belief about the item accordingly. If this issue is not con-
sidered by the bidders ex ante, negative prots may come out. However, winners
curseis not observed in equilibrium since bidders take it into account while prepar-
ing their bids. Hendricks and Porter (2003) analyzes this issue for oil and gas lease
auctions in Gulf of Mexico, and estimates the winners curse correction of bidders
nonparametrically.
One important issue in this context is the selection or participation problem. In
the real auction data it is observed that not all the potential bidders participate in
the auction even when reservation prices are low. Ignoring this issue is likely to cause
biased estimates. Li and Zheng (2009) consider a rst price auction model taking
this issue into account and study entry and competition e¤ects on bidding behavior.
They follow Bayesian estimation with MCMC techniques and apply their method to
timber sales. In a parallel study for timber auctions Athey et al. (2008) analyzes
6the issue of collusion among bidders using data from two di¤erent auction formats.
Both of these papers also take the unobserved auction heterogeneity (the information
observed by bidders but not by the researcher) into account.
1.1.2. Multi Unit Auctions
The papers mentioned so far are about single good auctions where in each sale only
one item is auctioned. The context is di¤erent however for example for treasury
or electricity auctions, in which bidders submit a price-quantity schedule instead of
a single monetary amount as in single unit auctions. These are called multi unit
auctions since bidders demand multiple units of the same good. Armantier and Sbai
(2006) compare uniform-price and discriminatory auction formats for French treasury
auctions. They nd informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. On
the other hand, Hortacsu and Puller (2008) study bidding behavior in Texas electricity
market. Using a data from Texas balancing energy market they compare actual bids
with those proposed by their model, and nd that basic predictions of their model
are consistent with the data.
1.2. Second Price Auctions
1.2.1. e-Bay Auctions
In this section we outline standard approaches in the literature to estimating bidders
values and the entry process in eBay auctions using parametric and nonparametric
methodologies. We assume throughout that the analyst is analyzing single item auc-
tions, that the item has private values, entry is exogenous, and that the following
7insight from Haile and Tamer (2003) holds. This assumption is that bidders follow
two intuitive rules:
(1) No bidder ever bids more than he is willing to pay.
(2) No bidder allows opponents to win at a price he is willing to pay.
The second assumption must be applied with care in eBay auctions. Even if one
considers exit as long as one assumes that the steady state hypothesis holds then this
insight should be correct. Why would the second highest bidder leave "money on the
table" in this auction to go to another auction where the competition will be just as
strict?
As explained above, bidding takes place by a proxy program. The bidder submits
a reservation price and the computer raises the price until only one bidder remains.
In such an auction the obvious action is to enter your reservation value (or simply
"value") as your reservation price, and the assumptions above makes sure that the
second highest bidder will do this. For each bidder there will be a common set
of auction specic characteristics xn (where n indicates the auction) and a private
component j (where j indicates the person). If the winning price is bwn , rn is the
traditional open reservation price, and values are log linear then the formula for the
winning bid is:
(1.1) bwn = max
n
rn; e
x0n(2)n   c
o
where (2)n is the private component of the second highest bidder in auction n given
there are I potential bidders, and c is the continuation value of bidders. We follow
8Sailer (2006) by assuming that bidders can not exit an auction until the auction is
nished and simplify the analysis by assuming this constant is independent of the
bidder.
Note that while in will be from a standard distribution, 
(2)
n , is not since it is
the second order statistic from a sample of I bids. One method to estimate (1.1)
is to use a Tobit model controlling for heteroskedasticity:However while this method
is consistent it is a reduced form approach, leaving the analyst with no information
about the true distribution of private values or how competitive the auction is. An
auction is competitive if the number of potential bidders, I, is large, and this variable
can not be estimated using reduced form techniques from this equation.
A straightforward methodology at this point would be to utilize formal maxi-
mum likelihood techniques, and extend them to allow for an exogenous entry process.
Let Fn (z; ) be the cumulative distribution function of the biddersvalues at z and
fn (z; ) be the probability density function where  may include some distribution
specic coe¢ cients. Let Ian be the number of active bidders in auction n or the
number who actually submitted bids, and for i 2 f0; 1g Din = 1 if Ian = i, Din = 0
otherwise. If I  Ian is the number of potential bidders in auction n the likelihood of
auction n given I is:
ln (jI) =

Fn (rn; )
I
D0n 
IFn (rn; )
I 1 (1  Fn (rn; ))
D1n (1.2) 
I (I   1)Fn (bwn ; )I 2 (1  Fn (bwn ; )) fn (bwn ; )
(1 D0n D1n)
.
9Inactive bidders are somewhat problematic. Although there must have been at least
Ian who have bid there might also be any number of bidders who thought about bidding
and did not. Therefore I is often treated as a random variable that can range from Ian
to I an arbitrary upper bound. One can view this treatment of identication and
estimation of the number of bidders I as a direct treatment for what would otherwise
be unobserved heterogeneity in each auction that potentially could be correlated with
outcomes of the bidding process. In this section we do not explicitly correlate the
number of bidders with other potential heterogeneity controls or the feed-back rating
of the seller, but rather estimate this potential auction specic unobservable. For
an extensive treatment of unobserved heterogeneity in rst-price auctions see Bierens
and Song (2008).
One could estimate the number of potential bidders in each auction as a constant
(perhaps varying with the length of auction or other discrete variables) or alternatively
one could estimate an entry process. The number of bidders in an auction is often
modeled as a Poisson entry process. The parameter of the entry process, n, is often
assumed to be log-linear in a set of auction specic characteristics zn. Notice that
some auction characteristics might a¤ect entry but not private values and vice a versa,
although it is di¢ cult to understand what these non-overlapping variables might be a
priori. However based on the analysis in the literature it seems clear that feedback
for example has a much stronger e¤ect on entry than it does on the sales price. A
convenient functional form for entry is:
(1.3) lnn = z0n :
10
Let Tn be the length of the auction and Dsrn be an indicator set to one if there is a
secret reservation price and zero otherwise. Then the total likelihood for auction n
with exogenous entry is:
(1.4) ln (; ) =
Ii=Ian+Dsrn
(nTn)
i
i!
e nTnln (ji)
Ii=Dsrn
(nTn)
i
i!
e nTn
.
The lower bound on i in both the denominator and the numerator is increased by one
if there is a secret reservation price, following the treatment in Bajari and Hortaçsu
(2003) wherein the auctioneer is treated as another bidder if there is a secret reser-
vation price. When analyzing eBay data sets based on spider programs that collect
information on auctions that do not result in sales as well as those that do, full likeli-
hood can be utilized, of course based on a parametric assumption for distribution of
private values and the entry process.
Since one cannot be certain a-priori of the true distribution of biddersvalues,
an array of distributions can be used and results based on these di¤erent parametric
distributions can be compared and analyzed, possibly with nonparametric diagnostic
methods. Results can also be compared with nonparametric methods. Common one-
sided distributions proposed in the literature are the folded logistic, gamma, Weibull,
log-normal, and Pareto.
Another methodology proposed by La¤ont, Ossard, and Vuong (1995) is to sim-
ulate the auction. La¤ont et al. focused on rst price auctions but the methodology
is the same for eBay auctions. Imagine running S auctions with I bidders in each
auction. In each simulation the second highest value is selected (Xsn (; I)) and these
11
values are averaged to form Xn (; I) = 1S
S
s=1Xsn (; I). If S is large then the dis-
tance between Xn (; I) and E

v(2)

will be small, and assuming one has the correct
value for I then the distance between Xn (; I) and E [bwn ] will be small. However, an
unbiased methodology must take into account that in practice S is not large, and thus
the objective function should compensate for the variance of the simulated estimator.
This variance is VSn (; I) = 1S(S 1)
S
s=1
 
Xsn (; I)  Xn (; I)
2
. Estimation of 
and I are then given by:
(1.5) argmin
;I
QS;N (; I) =
1
N
Nn=1
h 
bwn   Xn (; I)
2   VSn (; I)i
where N is the number of auctions. Note that the distribution of v(2) will be a
non-degenerate function of  and I: This allows identication of I. On an intuitive
level this is because I determines the amount of "skewness" in the observed prices.
Theoretically one could allow for exogenous entry as outlined above, but this could
prove computationally burdensome.
Another simulation based, parametric estimation approach comes from Bajari and
Hortacsu (2003). Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) species a structural econometric model
of eBay auctions, where Bayesian approach is taken to estimate the parameters of the
model. They model the eBay bidding problem in a second price sealed bid auction
setting with symmetric common value assumptions and stochastic entry, where the
entry of the potential bidders depends on a zero prot condition and the number of
actual bidders is determined by a Poisson process with mean t: At each auction,
12
bidders only observe a private signal xit about the value of the auctioned good vt,
where xit = vt + "it, "i is distributed i:i:d, and v s N(t; 2t ) and x s N(t; k2t )
(here t is the auction, and i is the bidder subscript). Being motivated by some em-
pirical regularities in the observed characteristics of the auction data, they estimate
reduced form relations between some observable auction variables and the structural
parameters. Then, they specify the likelihood function of the observed bids using the
data of the bidders who have not bid at all for each auction. By this way they assign
a positive likelihood to auctions with no bidders, hence make a good use of all the
available data. Showing the form of the likelihood function of the bids conditional on
the auction specic data and the structural parameters to be estimated, they use this
likelihood function to update their prior in the Markov-chain Monte Carlo method
by which they simulate the posterior distribution of the model parameters. In the
paper they emphasize the advantages to using a Bayesian approach when estimating
parametric auction models. First, Bayesian methods are computationally simple and
easier to implement than maximum likelihood. Since in many auction models, sup-
port of the distribution of the bids depends on the parameters, it is not possible to
apply standard asymptotic theory straightforwardly. Moreover, condence intervals
in a classical framework require second order asymptotic approximations, whereas
the results in this paper are correct in nite samples and do not require invoking
the assumptions used in second order asymptotics. Lastly, in some parametric auc-
tion models, Bayesian models are asymptotically e¢ cient while some commonly used
classical methods are not e¢ cient.2
2see Porter and Hirano (2001).
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Sailer (2006) is another interesting paper in terms of modeling and identication
strategy, preferring parametric techniques for estimation. Sailer (2006) sets up an
intertemporal optimization problem for an eBay bidder who faces an innite sequence
of Vickrey auctions for heterogenous products (She argues that only the bids at the
last minutes of the auction, when bidders are no more able to observe the bids by their
opponents, determine the sales price and the winner of the auction; thats why we can
take into account only the last minutes of an eBay auction and evaluate it as a sealed
bid second price auction.34 ) The intertemporal optimization setting is designed to
reect the tradeo¤between bidding today and waiting for tomorrow, where the bidder
optimally chooses a bid to maximize her expected benet from bidding minus the cost
of bidding, but still can choose to wait for the next auction without bidding in the
current auction (hence not incurring the cost of bidding now) if the expected future
payo¤ of waiting for the next auction is higher than the maximum of what she can
expect to get from bidding in the current auction. The problem can be summarized
as the following:
Vi(vi; s) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
max

max
bi>r
Eb(1)

1

b(1) < bi
	  
vi   b(1)

 ci + 1

b(1)  bi
	
V ei js

; V ei
	
,before win
0 ,after win
3Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) take a similar approach for the eBay auctions of some common value
goods.
4Nekipelov (2007) actually shows that early bidding can benet the bidder by entry deterrence,
hence the early bids may have an e¤ect on the result of the auction.
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where Vi(vi; s) is the value of having the opportunity of bidding in the current auction
given the realization of the valuation of bidder i for the currently auctioned good (vi),
the realizations of the characteristics of the currently auctioned good and the current
auction (s). bi is the bid of bidder i if she decides to participate in the current auction,
b(1) is the maximum bid of the bidder is opponents, vi is the realization of bidder
is valuation of the auctioned good after seeing the characteristics of the good and
the auction, ci is the cost of bidding for bidder i, and V ei is the continuation value
of bidder i (the value she expects to get from the next auctions if she fails to win in
the current auction or does not bid at all). The optimal bidding behavior of bidder i
requires the following equality:
(1.6) ci = Es;bi
h
Eb(1)

1

b(1) < b

i
	  
bi   b(1)
 js ji = 1i
where i = 1 denotes that it is optimal for bidder i to participate in the current
auction (the entry decision is a¢ rmative), and bi is the optimal bid of her. Clearly, we
could calculate the cost of bidder i if we could observe bi when it is a winning bid. (We
can only get biased estimates of the cost if we use the observed highest bid in place of
the highest bid bi ). This is the point where Sailer(2006) suggests a stepwise procedure
which allows her to show that both the distribution of valuations of the bidders and
their costs are non-parametrically identied. Given that the model is set under the
assumption of asymmetric bidders and that the available data are the bids of all
loosing bidders together with the transactions prices and the identities of the bidders
in each auction, the identication results from Athey and Haile (2007), Brendstrup
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and Paarsch (2006) and Song (2004) allow inference about the underlying parent
bid distributions. Then, given these bid distributions, estimates of the unobserved
winning bids can be built, which in turn are used to compute the costs from (1.6).
The likelihood function of the problem is shown to be the following:
l =
TX
t=1
ln
"
fblt (b(2);tjxt)(1  Fbmt (b(2);tjxt))
(1  Fblt (b(3);tjxt))(1  Fbmt (b(3);tjxt))
#
which is obtained from the summation of di¤erent auctions t due to the fact that the
auctions are independent of each other. Since the parent bid distributions are bidder
specic, the t dimension of the panel is not long enough to legitimize a non-parametric
approach. Hence the author assumes a normal form for the bid distributions such
that fbi(bijx) = N

bi ; 

with bi = cons + x   V 0i , where cons includes the part
of the continuation value of bidder i that is common for everyone, and the individual
specic part of the continuation value of i (V 0i ) is assumed to be a function of bidder
is cost ci. Hence we can approximate the V 0i by a polynomial in ci. However, the
plan is to calculate the value of ci from (1.6) after inferring the unobserved winning
bids from the estimated bid distribution, for which we need to know the value of
ci. Therefore we start with a guess about the value of ci, and this would be the
beginning of an iterative process which goes on until convergence of the estimated
bid distributions bFbijx and the bidding costs ci.
A non-parametric methodology can be based on Song (2004). Much attention has
been given to nonparametric alternatives to the structural models discussed above.
Athey and Haile (2007) show that the parent distribution is uniquely determined if
16
the distribution of any order statistic with a known sample size is identied. However,
in eBay auctions, the number of potential bidders is generally not observable. Song
(2004) addressed this issue by showing that within the symmetric independent private
values model, observation of any two valuations of which ranking from the top is
known non-parametrically identies the biddersunderlying value distribution. Based
on this theorem, Song argues that we can use the second and third highest bids to
identify the distribution of biddersprivate values.
In this technique one must assume not only that the second highest bidder bids
his true value but also the third highest bidder does, thus we assume explicitly that
vjn = e
x0njn   c
for at least the second and third highest bidders. These biddersvalues are denoted
v
(2)
n and v
(3)
n with the corresponding error terms 
(2)
n , and 
(3)
n  note that I may vary
by auction and is unknown throughout this analysis. Since we need both the second
and third highest bids for estimation, all auctions with two or fewer bidders must
be dropped. This methodology is not without attendant problems, however, since
whether or not the third highest bids reect the third highest bidderstrue private
valuations can be questioned. To deal with this issue, Song suggests that we should
"use data from auctions where the rst or the second highest bidder submitted a
cuto¤ price greater than the third highest valuation late in the auction". With this
in mind, she details an econometric method to decide "how late" is proper. The
interested reader should see Song (2004).
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In this methodology we can only use the partial likelihood of (2)n given 
(3)
n since
the full likelihood requires the unknown number of potential bidders. According to
the basic theory of order statistics, the sample likelihood function can be written as:
LN

f^

=
1
N
NX
n=1
ln
2
h
1  F^


(2)
n
i
f^


(2)
n

h
1  F^


(3)
n
i2 ;
where
F^ (z) =
Z z
v
f^ (t) dt:
Here and below, v is the lower bound of biddersprivate value. Denotem = min

v
(2)
n

.
Note that no information about F (v) for v < m can be observed. If a starting price
set by a seller is below m with positive probability, then m is a consistent estimate
of v : In order to estimate the unknown distribution one can employ the method pro-
posed by Coppejans and Gallant (2002) and use the hermite series to approximate
the unknown distribution:
bf (z) =
h
1 + a1
 
z u


+   + ak
 
z u

ki2
 (z;u; ; v)R1
v
h
1 + a1
 
z u


+   + ak
 
z u

ki2
 (z;u; ; v) dz
where  (z;u; ; v) is the density of N(u; ) truncated at m .Then an estimator of
bf (z) , denoted as bfN (z), is the maximizer of LN f^, such that
(ba1; :::;bak; bu; b) = argmax
a1;:::;ak;u2R;>0
LN( bf) = 1
N
NX
n=1
ln
2
h
1  F^


(2)
n
i
f^


(2)
n

h
1  F^


(3)
n
i2
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Gallant and Nychka (1987), Fenton and Gallant (1996) and Coppejans and Gal-
lant (2002) provide details of this method to approximate the unknown distribution
of private values. The optimal series length varies according to the data set under
consideration. One can choose the optimal series length, k, using the cross-validation
strategy employing the Integrated Squared Error (ISE) criterion (Coppejans and Gal-
lant, 2002).
Another work that makes use of the SNP approach developed by Gallant and
Nychka (1987) is by Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006). Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006)
work under the assumption of asymmetric valuations and known number of potential
bidders. They develop a theoretical model of bidder behavior at single unit English
auctions when valuations of the bidders are assumed to be independent draws from
one of the J di¤erent classes of distributions. Then, in the light of Theorem 2 in
Athey and Haile (2007), they demonstrate that the distribution of the di¤erent classes
of latent valuations are nonparametrically identied when the winning bid, identity
of the winner and the number of potential bidders n is observed. They propose a
semi-nonparametric (SNP) estimation strategy. Finally, they extend the analysis to
multi-unit auctions.
In order to show the identication of the J di¤erent classes of distributions, Brend-
strup and Paarsch (2006) start from the probability density function of the second
highest order statistics of n independent draws each from one of the J di¤erent types
of distributions, due to Balakrishnan and Rao (1998):
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g(2:n)(yjF) = 1
(n  2)!Perm
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
Ftype(1)(y) : : : Ftype(n)(y)
: : :
: : :
: : :
Ftype(1)(y) : : : Ftype(n)(y)
ftype(1)(y) : : : ftype(n)(y)
1  Ftype(1)(y)

: : :

1  Ftype(n)(y)

1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
where F is the vector of the cumulative distribution functions of the J parent classes
of distributions, Ftype(i)(y) and ftype(i)(y) stand for the CDF and the PDF of the ith
bidders valuation respectively, and Perm is the permanent operator. Then they
develop the following system of Pfa¢ an integral equations:
F0type(y) = exp

A 1 log

diag
Z y
0
exp
  log n   F0type(u)	 dG0(u)T
where F0type and dG
0 are (n 1) column vectors whose ith rows equal F 0type(i)(y) (the
true population cumulative distribution function for the class type(i)) and dG0(2:n)(y; i)
(the derivative of the true population cumulative distribution function of the winning
bid at an auction won by a bidder whose identity is i), respectively. From Meilijson
(1981), this system of Pfa¢ an integral equations have a unique solution, which in turn
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leads the authors to conclude that the distributions of the valuations are identied
from the winning bids and the identities of the winners.
Having shown the identication of the latent distributions of the valuations, the
authors propose an estimator using the SNP estimator developed by Gallant and
Nychka (1987) in a way to introduce covariates into the system. They dene the
draw of bidder i who is in class j in the tth auction as follows:
log V ijt = xtj + U
ij
t
They approximate fj(u) by
fpTj (u) =
"
pTX
k=0
jkHk(u)
#2
exp
  u2=2+ " exp   u2=2
where Hk(u) denotes an Hermite polynomial of order k. Then they implement this
nite order approximation into the method of quasi-maximum likelihood , dening
the estimator ncfjToJ
j=1
= arg max
fj2zjT
1
T
TX
t=1
log g(2:n)(yt; itjF)
where
zjT =
8<:fjT 2 zj : fjT (ujj) =
"
pTX
k=0
jkHk(u)
#2
exp
  u2=2+ " exp( u2=2);j 2 jT
9=;
and
jT =

j = (j0; :::; jpT ) :
Z 1
0
fjT (ujj)du = 1

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The approximation will converge to the truth by letting pT increase at a rate that is
slower than the rate at which the sample size T increases.
One of the important papers in terms of identication strategy is Adams (2007).
In a setting similar to Song (2004), Adams (2007) generalizes the result that the
value distribution is identied from the observed auction prices when the number of
bidders is known or randomly determined (Athey and Haile, 2007). Although the
number of actual bidders in an eBay auction is observable, we cannot say that it is
randomly determined, because of the selection bias resulting from the format of the
eBay auctions. It can be argued that there is a set of potential bidders which are
randomly determined, but for which the number is not known (Song, 2004). Adams
(2007) shows that the value distribution is identied when the auction prices are
observed and the probability distribution over the number of potential bidders is
known, under the assumption that the potential number of bidders is independent
from the values of bidders in an auction. Nevertheless, it is not clear if it is possible
to determine this distribution, since the existence of potential bidders in an auction
can be censored. The author argues and shows in a formal proof, that some auction
characteristics that a¤ect the number of bidders but not the distribution of bidder
valuations in an auction will allow us approximate this distribution arbitrarily closely
under some assumptions. The auction length can be given as an example of such a
characteristic: with varying auction length, the probability of having n bidders in an
auction varies, but the value distribution does not. Hence, for the estimation of the
structural parameters, the length of the auction is included in the function dening
the probability of having n people in the auction, but not in the value function of
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the bidder. The author applies OLS on the price data, and uses the order statistics
approach in a maximum likelihood estimation, preferring a log-normal assumption
for the distribution of the value. Results of the two estimations show that OLS may
substantially overestimate the average value.
Another non-parametric estimation approach comes from Haile and Tamer (2003).
As mentioned at the beginning of the current section, the authors have two weak
assumptions as to how to interpret the observed bids in an English auction. But it is
clear that the distribution of the bidder valuations is not identied having assumed
these rules which imply neither (i) a unique distribution of bids given a distribution
of valuations nor (ii) a unique distribution of valuations given a distribution of bids.
However, they argue that informative bounds on the distribution functions of bidder
valuations are possible to identify out of this incomplete model of bidding. The
identication of the upper bound for the distribution of the valuations F (v) is provided
by the property of the i.i.d random variables that the distribution of the ith order
statistic Fi:n(:) is related to the parent distribution F (:) by
(1.7) F (v) = (Fi:n(:); i; n)5
together with the implication of the rst assumption that bi:n  vi:n for all i. Therefore
(1.8) Fi:n(v)  Gi:n(v) 8i; n; v
5see for example Arnold,Balakrishnan and Nagaraja (1992)
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where i denotes the bidder, n is the total number of bids, Gi:n(:) denotes the distribu-
tion of the ith lowest bid, and (:; i; n) is a strictly increasing di¤erentiable function.
Applying the monotone transformation (:; i; n) on both sides of (1.8) implies the
identication of the upper bound FU(v) as the following:
(1.9) F (v)  FU(v)  min
n2f2;:::;Mg;i2f1;:::;ng
(Gi:n(v); i; n)
for all v in the relevant range and higher than the reservation price. Note that there
is a di¤erent bound on F (v) for each pair of indices (i; n), thus the minimization
operator chooses the tightest one among them. For the identication of the lower
bound, the following implication of the second assumption (bidders do not allow an
opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat) gains importance: The second
highest valuation has to be smaller than or equal to the highest bid plus the minimum
bid increment:
(1.10) vn 1:n  bn:n+ M
Obviously this provides an upper bound on the realization of only one order statistic
of the valuation at each auction, but (1.7) enables us to construct a lower bound for
the latent distribution. From (1.10) we can easily write
(1.11) Fn 1:n(v)  GMn:n(v) 8n; v
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where GMn:n(:) is the distribution of Bn:n+ M. Then, analogous to the derivation of
the upper bound, we apply the monotone transformation to both sides of (1.11) and
recall (1.7) to nally get the identication of the lower bound FL(v):
(1.12) F (v)  FL(v)  max
n
(GMn:n(v);n  1; n)
for all v in the relevant range and greater than the reservation price. Note that
whenever vn 1:n = bn:n for some n, the lower bound implied by (1.10) is the true
distribution; and whenever bi:n = vi:n for some (i; n), the upper bound obtained
from above is the true distribution. Therefore we can say that there is no cost to
taking this bound approach rather than assuming the full structure of the standard
model, since only when the data is inconsistent with the standard model we identify
bounds on F (:) rather than identify F (:) itself. Consistent nonparametric estimators
for the upper and lower bounds FU(v) and FL(v) are obtained by substituting the
relevant empirical distribution functions for their population analogs in (1.9) and
(1.12) respectively. The estimators are
bFU(v)  min
n2f2;:::;Mg;i2f1;:::;ng
( bGi:n(v); i; n);
bFL(v)  max
n2f2;:::;Mg
( bGMn:n(v);n  1; n)
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where
bGi:n(v) = 1
Tn
TX
t=1
1 [nt = n; bi:nt  v] ;
bGMn:n(v) = 1Tn
TX
t=1
1 [nt = n; bnt:nt+ Mt v]
and
Tn =
TX
t=1
1 [nt = n]
A negative property of these fairly simple non-parametric estimators is that, although
they are uniformly consistent6, these estimators can be badly biased in small samples.
The authors propose a smoothing operation in order to improve the small sample
performance of the estimators.
A nal non-parametric methodology comes from Nekipelov (2007). In his paper,
he explains two types of aggressive bidder behavior induced by the multi-auction
structure of eBay in a continuous time stochastic auction model with endogenous
entry, in which bidder types are di¤erentiated by their initial information regarding
the entry process. It is the only continuous time auction model that we are aware of
in the literature, though there are more aspects that are specic to this paper. One
is the visibility parameter  of a given auction, which brings a stochastic component
into the model: even if the bidder is completely certain about the quality of the object
itself, she can be uncertain about the group of potential rivals. Bidders have prior
beliefs in the form of probability distributions over the value of visibility, and they
6The asymptotic distribution of the estimators and the consistency of the bootstrap bands are shown
in Haile and Tamer (2002).
26
can update their beliefs over the course of the auction. The other is that the bidder
who arrives in the auction gives a best response to the entire path of price process
rather than to actions of particular rival bidders. The model is composed of four
key structural functions: the instantaneous demand function (this is the frequency
of the poisson process that species the entry rate to an auction) (t; pt; ), the
price jump size function h(t; pt; ) (where  is the bid increment), the distribution
of valuations of the bidders F (v), and the distribution of biddersbeliefs about the
visibility parameter (the mean and the variance of it) G(0) and G(0). These
structural functions of the model are dened to be non-parametrically identied from
the data if no two di¤erent sets of characteristics of the model produces the same
distribution of simulated prices. This denition requires two conditions to hold. First,
the observable distribution (this is the joint distribution of timing and the sizes of
price jumps for the data set used in the paper) should contain su¢ cient information
about the structural functions of the model. Second, the structural functions of the
model can be recovered by using some method of inversion of the observed joint
distribution. The author lists the assumptions that allow the unique recovery from
the data the set of structural functions of the model. The distribution of bidders
valuation is identied from the distribution of the number of active bidders across
auctions given the price, if the bidding function is assumed to be monotone with
respect to the valuation in each moment of time and that the beliefs are independent
from valuations. After the distribution of the valuations is identied, it is possible to
identify the mean beliefs of the bidders by the distance between their observed bidding
patterns given their information and the pattern computed for an auction with given
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visibility and given structural functions. Lastly, sorting the bidders according to the
relative number of their bids will identify the variance of the beliefs of bidders, as
the model predicts that bidders with more di¤use priors bid more frequently. Finally,
given the distributions of valuations and beliefs, the path of the second highest bid
can be simulated for any given instantaneous demand and price jump size function,
and minimizing the distance between the observed price path and the simulated price
path gives us the estimate for the parameters of the Poisson process. The multi-step
estimation procedure starts with non-parametric estimation of the distribution of the
observed price and timing of jump data f(pt; Nt; t; 0), which is characterized by the
structural parameter 0, using a kernel:
bf(p; t) = 1
n
nX
k=1
1
hpht
IkX
i=1

 
p
(k)
i   p
hp
!

 
t
(k)
i   t
ht
!
where Nt is the total number of bidders who have entered the auction up to time t,
n is the number of observed auctions, k is the index of an auction, Ik is the number
of price jumps in the auction k, (:) is a kernel function and hp and ht are bandwidth
parameters. This density estimate is consistent and asymptotically normal. In the
second step the entry of the biddersNt is simulated given the parameter vector , then
optimal bidding problem of each bidder is solved to calculate the second highest bid in
the auction at any given instant. This simulated price data is named as the response of
the structural model to the data. Then the same non-parametric estimation procedure
is applied to the simulated price data to get the estimated distribution bf(p; t), which
is also a consistent estimate. Then, Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC)
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is used to compare the joint distribution of the observed and the simulated price and
time of the price jump data:
(1.13) \KLIC =
1
n
nX
k=1
IkX
i=1
log
" bf(p(k)i ; t(k)i )bf(p(k)i ; t(k)i )
#
The idea here is to compare the empirical model with the structural model. Note
that minimizing the KLIC is equivalent to maximizing
Ln() =
1
n
nX
k=1
IkX
i=1
log
h bf(p(k)i ; t(k)i )i
The author shows the estimate of the parameter  obtained by minimizing (1.13) is
asymptotically normal. Markov-Chain Monte Carlo method is used to minimize (1.13)
with a substantially reduced computational burden. This also gives an asymptotically
normally distributed estimator, though the asymptotic variance of the estimate needs
a small correction.
Hong and Nekipelov (2009) develop an e¢ cient local instrumental variable esti-
mation of an empirical auction model. In particular, they derive semi-parametric
e¢ ciency bounds and e¢ cient estimators for the conditional monotone local instru-
mental variable model studied in Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002). They apply
this semiparametrically e¢ cient estimation method to analyze the relation between
bid dispersion and early bidding in the dataset which is collected from a natural ex-
periment conducted in Nekipelov (2007). One of the implications of the theoretical
model developed in Nekipelov (2007) is that early bidding has competing e¤ects on
the dispersion of bids. On the one hand, early bidding deters entry and decreases
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the bid dispersion. On the other hand, early bidding provides more information and
potentially increases both learning and bid dispersion. In an attempt to test which
e¤ect is dominant, Hong and Nekipelov (2009) apply the local instrumental variable
approach trying to walk around the endogeneity problem that can arise with a simple
regression of bid variation on an early bidding indicator because of the correlation of
some unobserved characteristics of auction (visibility) with both early jump bidding
and bid dispersion. A local instrumental variable is given by an exogenous change of
supply in the natural experiment conducted in Nekipelov (2007), who auctioned o¤
additional supply of Robbie WilliamsCD on eBay. Such an exogenous increase in the
supply weakly increases the incentive for early jump bidding. The set of compliers are
dened as the auctions which have no early jump bid prior to the supply increase but
have early jump bid after the supply increases. In the rst step of the estimation, the
basic result in Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) is used to nd the initial consis-
tent but ine¢ cient estimate of the parameter vector. In the second step, an estimate
of the weighting matrix is formed, and e¢ cient estimates of the parameter vector is
obtained. Results of the estimation actually reveal the ine¢ ciency of the rst step
estimates; although the same parameter values were obtained from the rst step and
at the end of second step, the standard errors from the second step are much smaller
than the ones obtained from the rst step estimation. Moreover, the estimates from
OLS and 2SLS are compared. They nd that the coe¢ cient of the early bid indicator
is positive in both, but signicantly greater in 2SLS than in OLS : a result consistent
with the prediction of omitted variable bias.
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The eld of econometrics has been providing methods for investigation of bid-
der behavior in eBay auctions that are well grounded in economic theory. Today, a
researcher has a number of commonly used alternative structural methods like max-
imum likelihood (Adams 2007), non parametric methods (Song, 2004; Brendstrup
and Paarsch, 2006; Nekipelov, 2007), simulation based methods (Bajari and Hor-
tacsu, 2003) and bounds estimation of incomplete models (Haile and Tamer, 2003),
as well as methods for identifying empirical relationship between various character-
istics of online auctions (Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007; Hong and Nekipelov, 2009).
As long as one has enough sample size for standard asymptotic results to hold, us-
ing non-parametric methods have advantages in terms of robustness to distributional
misspecication, although parametric methods are more convenient with small sam-
ple sizes and high number of covariates included in the analyses, besides having a
higher convergence rate. Another issue that gains importance with non-parametric
estimation of structural models is the identication problem. Although we have some
standard results about identication under di¤erent assumptions (Athey and Haile,
2007), development of new structural models will require new identication results
(Nekipelov, 2007).
CHAPTER 2
Structural Estimation of an Asymmetric Common Value
Auction Model
2.1. Introduction
Auctions have been a popular research area in the last fty years due to their
prevalence as a selling mechanism. Since the seminal paper by Vickrey (1961), re-
searchers have shown more interest in the topic and analyzed it from di¤erent per-
spectives. Early papers mostly focus on the theoretical aspect of the topic1. Later,
with the availability of the data, researchers have started to use structural models
to test the theory and make counterfactual experiments for policy analysis. Most of
these papers propose structural methods assuming that bidders have private values,
whereas only a few study common value auctions. In this chapter, we propose a
structural estimation method for a common value environment where bidders posses
asymmetric information. Then we test the performance of our estimator in Monte-
Carlo experiments.
Structural auction models started to garner interest in early 90s. Paarsch (1992)
is one of the early papers in this area which proposes parametric estimation meth-
ods for rst price auctions. An important concern in estimating a structural auction
model is that the support of bids depends on the parameter to be estimated, thereby
1See, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1982).
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violating one of the regularity conditions in maximum likelihood estimation. This
causes the estimates to have a nonstandard asymptotic behavior that complicates the
inference. Donald and Paarsch (1993) suggest a piecewise pseudo-likelihood estima-
tion method to handle this problem. Another issue in estimating a structural auction
model is the highly nonlinear bid function which makes the likelihood function com-
putationally cumbersome. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) propose a two stage
nonparametric estimation method based on the rst order condition of bidders which
does not require computing the nonlinear bid function. Most of the papers in the
literature studied private value environments since bid function is simpler compared
to that in a common value setting. Two of the exceptions are Bajari and Hortacsu
(2003) and Hendricks et al (2003). The former paper focuses on the eBay environment
and estimates the determinants of buyer valuations under a common value environ-
ment. Through counterfactual experiments, they quantify the winners curse and
examine the optimal selling strategies. On the other hand, Hendricks et al (2003)
study OCS Wildcat leases using a common value auction model but they do not es-
timate the structural parameters of it. Moreover, both papers assume that bidders
have symmetric information about the quality of the auctioned item.
In this paper, we study a common value auction setting where bidders have asym-
metric information about the quality of the item. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the rst paper that proposes a structural estimation method for this environment.
We assume that there is an informed bidder and a number of uninformed bidders.
Informed bidder has more channels to obtain information about the item quality, and
thus has more precise information than uninformed bidders have.
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A classical example of this environment is the OCS drainage leases in Gulf of
Mexico. Since 1954, the federal government has been holding auctions to lease the
rights to extract oil and gas in Gulf of Mexico2. Between 1954 and 1982, each tract in
the area was sold through a rst price sealed bid auction. Also, for some tracts there
existed some previously leased and drilled neighbor tracts which convey signicant
amount of information for its owners about the neighbor tracts. In general, the pre-
vious drilling information from a neighbor tract is superior to the publicly observable
seismic signal. Therefore, owners of the neighbor tracts have an informational ad-
vantage over other bidders. In general, auctions in which both incumbent rms and
new comers participate constitute a possible example for an asymmetric information
auction environment. The incumbent rm may have an informational advantage due
to its previous operations in the industry.
We use the theoretical model given in Hendricks and Porter (1988) (hereafter
HP), which extends the models studied in Wilson (1967) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans
et al (1983).We propose a two stage estimation for the structural model following
the approach in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). In the rst stage, we estimate
the distribution of uninformed bids and then using the rst order condition of the
informed bidder we estimate the unobserved private information of the informed bid-
der. In the second stage, we estimate the distribution of the private information which
then allows one to conduct counterfactual analysis. The method is computationally
2Indeed, tracts in Gulf of Mexico are still being leased, yet the rules of auctions changed in 1982. Since
1983, the U.S. Mineral Managemeng Service (MMS) adopted area wide leasing, which dramatically
changed the bidding environment for companies.
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attractive since it does not require computing the bid function of the informed bid-
der. Also, under certain cases it can be implemented nonparametrically. We test the
performance of our estimator for both parametric and nonparametric settings.
The next section introduces the theoretical model. Section 3 explains the estima-
tion procedure. Monte Carlo experiments to test the performance of our estimator
are given in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2. Theoretical Model
The theoretical model we use is from HP. In this section we give a summary
of the asymmetric common value auction model they study. Their bidding model
is a version of the non-cooperative, rst price, sealed bid model with asymmetric
information3, and they use it to analyze OCS drainage leases. OCS auctions have
been held by the federal government since 1954 to lease oil and gas extraction rights
in Gulf of Mexico. Before 1982, there were three di¤erent sales of tracts: wildcat,
drainage, and development. HP studies OCS drainage leases where bidders have
asymmetric information about the resource potential. They assume the following for
their analysis: (i) there is no information externality between tracts sold in the same
sale; (ii) each bidder is risk neutral; (iii) the bidding strategy of each bidder for a
tract depends only on the state of information and competition for that tract.
The source of the information asymmetry is based on the fact that rms that
already own a neighbor tract (the informed rms) have more informative signals than
the signals that rms without any neighbor tract (the uninformed rms) get only
3This model was rst introduced by Wilson (1967), and later studied by Weverbergh (1979) and
Engelbrecht-Wiggan et al (1983).
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from seismic surveys. This is because informed rms have private information from
exploratory drilling on the neighbor tract. Since the values of tracts are expected to
be spatially correlated, this drilling information is more precise than seismic survey
information.
Following the notation in HP, we assume that, in each auction, there exists an
informed bidder and n uninformed bidders. Focusing on an individual auction and
suppressing the covariates, let V be the common value of the item being auctioned4.
We assume that V is unknown to all bidders. All bidders have access to a public
signal denoted by Z which is weakly correlated with V . Moreover, the informed
bidder has additional private information about the item, X, which is more precise
than Z. In other words, the private information of the informed bidder is su¢ cient
for the public signal. The informed rm observes the realizations of X and Z prior to
bidding, while uninformed rms observe only the realization of Z. The distributions,
and the bidding strategies are dependent on Z, but this dependence is suppressed in
the bidding strategies for the notational convenience.
The private information of the informed bidder is summarized by the real valued
random variableH = E [V j X;Z], which is assumed to have a continuous distribution
F (jz), with nite mean H. We call H the private signal of the informed bidder. Let
(h) be the strategy of the informed bidder which maps the realizations of H into
the nonnegative real numbers. (h) is assumed to be di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
function on the range (R;1) ,whereR is the reservation price. Also, let  1 (b) =  (b)
be the inverse bid function .
4We use capitals to denote random variables, and small letters for their realizations.
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The strategy of uninformed bidder i is a distribution function Gi () over the
nonnegative real numbers, and G (b) = G1 (b)    Gn (b) is the distribution function
of the maximum of the bids submitted by n uninformed bidders.
Given the above assumptions, the problem of the informed bidder with a private
signal h is,
Max

G ( (h))  (h   (h))
First order optimality condition for the informed bidder gives the following:
(2.1) h =  +
G ()
g()
where g() is the pdf of the maximum bid of n uninformed bidders.
The problem of an uninformed bidder i, which submits a bid higher than R, is5
Max
b
E [H   b j  (b) > h; z]  F ( (b) j z)  Q
j 6=i
Gj(b)
HP shows that the (n+ 1)-tuple (; G1   Gn) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
prole if and only if
5HP allows for possible di¤erences in tract valuations or costs by dening the expected value of the
drainage tract to the non-neighbor rm as E [H j z]   c, where c is a xed, nonnegative constant.
We assume this constant is zero for simplicity.
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(2.2) G(b) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1; b > H
F ( (b) ; z) ; R < b < H
F ((R); z) ; 0  b < R
(2.3)  (h) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
E [H j H  h; z] ; h > bh
R; bh  h  R
0; h < R
where bh solves E hH j H  bh; zi = R.
A zero bid is interpreted as no bid. It is important to point out the double ad-
vantage of the informed bidder against its competitors in order to understand the
equilibrium strategies. The informed bidder not only has a more accurate estimate
of the tracts value but also knows precisely what information his competitors posses.
The randomization strategy of uninformed bidders is a consequence of the latter in-
formational advantage of the informed bidder. If the uninformed bidder follows a pure
strategy, since all the information known to it is also observed by the informed bidder,
it would be predictable; hence it would be certain to lose on average. By randomizing,
the uninformed bidder will earn positive expected prot on some tracts, and the ex-
pected prots are zero only on average. Equilibrium strategy of the informed bidder
on
 
R;H

is uniquely determined by the condition that, in equilibrium, uninformed
bidders must earn zero prots.
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The equilibrium of the bidding game above gives some idea about the conditional
distributions of the maximum informed and uninformed bids. HP also note that the
supports of the equilibrium density functions of the informed bid f () and maximum
uninformed bid g () are identical and consist of f0g and the interval R;H. The
two distributions di¤er in the probability of no bid (zero bid), and of the reservation
bid R. G() possesses a mass point equal to F
bh at f0g, and it is constant at this
value on the interval (0; R]. The distribution of the neighbor bid F  also has a mass
point at f0g, but it is equal to F (R), which is less than F
bh. The distribution is
constant at F (R) on the open interval (0; R), and then jumps discontinuously upward
at R, the value of the mass point being F
bh  F (R).
2.3. Structural Estimation
In this section we describe the structural estimation method for the model given in
the previous section. We are interested in estimating the private signal of the informed
bidder h and its distribution F (:) given the bids of informed and uninformed bidders.
To do this, we follow the approach in Guerre et al (2000) and propose a two step
estimation method. The method is based on the rst order condition of the informed
bidder and does not require us to compute the nonlinear bid function nor its density.
In the rst step, we estimate the cdf and pdf of the maximum uninformed bid. We
then plug their estimates in the rst order condition of the informed bidder and obtain
the estimate of the private signal of the informed bidder. Using these estimates, in
the second step, we estimate the distribution of the private signal. The estimation
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method can be implemented both parametrically or nonparametrically. We explain
in detail how to conduct the estimation for both cases.
2.3.1. Nonparametric Analysis
2.3.1.1. Identication. An important issue in any structural model is the iden-
tication of the model. We rst discuss nonparametric identication of the model.
Identication in this context amounts to establishing a one-to-one mapping between
informed bid, , and private signal, h. To ensure this, we assume a su¢ cient condition
that the cdf of the maximum uninformed bid, G(:), is logconcave. This is satised by
most of the commonly used distributions such as normal, exponential, uniform etc.
The logconcavity of G(:) implies that G()
g()
is nondecreasing which in turn yields the
right hand side of equation 2.1 strictly increasing. Thus, for each informed bid in the
data there corresponds a unique private signal.
Nevertheless, the distribution of bids and the corresponding distribution of private
signal are truncated. This is because R, the reserve price is a lower bound for bids
and the corresponding private signal. To identify the distributions over their entire
supports, one would need to estimate the truncation probability at R. In general,
this could require additional information or structural assumptions. For example, in a
private value environment with symmetrically informed bidders, one can use the total
number of participating bidders to estimate the truncation probability at the reserve
price, as suggested in Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000). In our case, we do not need
any other information nor to make other assumptions for this purpose. Knowing that
there are at least one informed and one uninformed bidder in each auction su¢ ces.
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This is an advantage of our estimation method because in many applications of rst
price auctions with private value bidders, researchers assume a nonbinding reserve
price to avoid the truncation issue. The structure of the model allows us to handle
this straightforwardly.
On the other hand, an important assumption of the model necessary for the iden-
tication is that there is only one informed bidder at each auction. This makes the
rst order condition of the informed bidder similar to that of a bidder in a rst price
auction with private values. Therefore, the private signal of the informed bidder
can be identied. In a symmetric common value auction environment, however, it is
shown by La¤ont and Vuong (1996) that private signals of bidders are not identied
nonparametrically, since the rst order condition of bidders changes due to winners
curse correction6. Because informed bidders know all the information available to
uninformed bidders, winners curse is not an issue for informed bidders. Hence, they
do not account for winners curse in their maximization problem and their private
signals turn out to be identied. This is a very interesting point since, even though
the symmetric common value model is not identied nonparametrically, the asym-
metric common value model in this paper is identied. Should there exists more than
one informed bidder at the auction, identication result holds no longer because in-
formed bidders, in this case, should also correct for winners curse that arises due to
unobserved private information of other informed bidders.
2.3.1.2. Estimation. Regarding the estimation strategy, it also follows the steps
of identication. In the rst stage, we nonparametrically estimate the distribution
6See Hendricks et al (2003) for a symmetric common value auction environment with participation.
41
and density functions, G(:) and g(:), of the maximum uninformed bid using the unin-
formed bid data. Then, we plug in the informed bid, , and the estimated distribution
and density, bG(:) and bg(:), of the maximum uninformed bid in equation 2.1 to es-
timate private signal of the informed bidder. Following Guerre et al (2000) we call
the estimated private signals as pseudo-signals. In the second stage, this sample of
private pseudo-signals is used to estimate nonparametrically the underlying distrib-
ution of h, F (:). In this case, we assume that auctions are homogenous. However,
the methodology can straightforwardly be extended to capture covariates by using
conditional distributions of bids and the private signal.
We assume that there are T auctions, and for each auction t = 1; :::; T there exist
one informed bidder and nt uninformed bidders. As a consequence of the equilibrium
of the model, we are interested only in the maximum of the uninformed bids. Thus,
we have T maximum uninformed bids, fbtgTt=1, and T informed bids, ftgTt=1. Also,
let Tb be the number of maximum uninformed bids higher than or equal to R. In the
rst step, we use the uninformed bids, fbtgTt=1, to estimate G(:jb  R), g(:jb  R),
and the truncation probability G(R) nonparametrically by the following empirical
distribution and the kernel density estimators, respectively:
(2.4) bG(bjb  R) = 1
Tb
TbX
t=1
I(bt  b)
(2.5) bg(bjb  R) = 1
Tbhg
TbX
t=1
Kg

b  bt
hg

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bG(R) = 1
T
TX
t=1
I(bt = 0)
where hg is a bandwidth and Kg() is a kernel with compact support. We then
estimate the unconditional cdf and pdf of maximum nonneighbor bid by bG(b) =
bG(bjb  R):(1  bG(R)) and bg(b) = bg(bjb  R):(1  bG(R)), respectively.
Moreover, it is well known that kernel estimators are biased close to the boundary
of the support. So, if one works with distributions with bounded supports, one can
trim the distribution of the maximum uninformed bid following Guerre et al (2000)
to handle this issue. In particular, R and the maximum of the maximum uninformed
bids, bmax = maxfbtgTt=1; can be taken as lower and upper bounds, respectively.
Then, for the second stage, only signals corresponding to bids, that are away from
the boundaries, are taken into consideration, as follows:
(2.6) eht =
8>><>>:
t +
bG(t)bg(t) , if R + hg  t  bmax   hg
+1 ,otherwise
The sample of pseudo signals fehtgTt=1 is then used to estimate the density of the
signals. A truncation issue as in the rst stage of the estimation also exist in the
second stage. The pseudo signals obtained from the FOC are higher than bh, and in
order to estimate the density of signals over its entire support we need to estimate
the truncation probability at bh. Since there exists at least one informed bidder in
each auction, we can use the ratio of zero or reserve informed bids for this purpose.
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Let Th be the number of pseudo signals in the sample. Then we can use the following
estimators:
(2.7) bf(hjh > bh) = 1
Thhf
ThX
t=1
Kf
 
h  eht
hf
!
bF (bh) = 1
T
ThX
t=1
I(t = 0)
where hf is a bandwidth andKf is a kernel with compact support again. We can then
estimate the unconditional density of signals by bf(h) = bf(hjh > bh):(1   bF (bh)):Note
that although we do not know the value of bh in advance, we can still carry out the
estimation since it is su¢ cient to know whether a pseudo signal is greater than bh.
2.3.2. Parametric Estimation
Having shown nonparametric identication and estimation, now we describe the para-
metric version of the estimation method. In most cases, auctions are heterogenous,
and use of covariates is necessary to capture the heterogeneity. Due to the curse of the
dimensionality in nonparametric estimation, parametric estimation can be attractive
for heterogeneous data. Therefore, we explicitly include covariates in the parametric
estimation. In the rst stage, we estimate the distribution of the maximum unin-
formed bid conditional on the publicly available information, Gt(:jzt), by maximum
likelihood. Then, we plug the informed bid as well as the estimated conditional dis-
tribution and density, bGt(:jzt) and bgt(:jzt); in equation 2.1 to estimate the signals.
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In the second stage, we estimate the conditional distribution of signal by maximum
likelihood again.
Suppose that Gt(:jzt) is a distribution with a parameter vector t which is a func-
tion of the publicly available information , i.e. t = 
(zt) for all t. Because we assume
a parametric form forGt(:jzt), we can handle the truncation in the likelihood function.
Denoting the maximum uninformed bids and covariates by b and Z, respectively, we
construct the following likelihood function:
logL(
jb;Z) =
TP
t=1
[I(bt > 0)  log(gt(btjzt)) + I(bt  R)  log(Gt(Rtjzt))]
where Rt is the announced reservation price in auction t. We get the estimates of the
parameters of the distribution of uninformed bids as the following:
b
 = argmax


logL(
jb;Z))
Now for each auction t, we can plug the estimates in equation 2.1 to nd the
pseudo signal of the informed bidder as follows:
eht = t + bGt(:jzt)bgt(:jzt)
Let Th be the number of signals greater than bht, as before. In the second stage
of the estimation, we use these pseudo signals eht for t = 1; :::; Th to estimate the
distribution of H, conditional on the publicly available information. We basically
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follow the procedure in the rst stage and assume thatH has a parametric distribution
with parameter , which is a function of the public information as  =  (zt). Denoting
the set of pseudo private signals by eh, we estimate the parameters of this density by
maximizing the following likelihood function:
logL( jeh;Z) = TP
t=1
h
I(eht > bht) log(f(ehtjzt)) + I(bht  eht  Rt) log(F (bhtjzt)  F (Rtjzt))
+I(eht  Rt) log(F (Rtjzt))i
Note that contrary to nonparametric estimation, one needs to calculate F (bhtjzt)
since it appears in the above likelihood function. However, bht is unknown before es-
timation. This could cause a problem depending on the data on hand. In practice, if
no informed bidder submitted the reserve price7, then one could carry out the estima-
tion without problem. Such a situation may occur if, for example, the reserve price is
too low or nonbinding. Otherwise, one would need to make additional assumptions.
Depending on the data and the environment, one assumption could be that Rt and
bht are very close so that the second term in the likelihood function is negligible. Re-
call that we do not have this problem in nonparametric estimation which is another
advantage of it.
We get the estimates of the parameters of the distribution of private signals of
informed bidders as the following:
7For example, this is the case in the data we use for the empirical application in the next chapter.
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b  = argmax
 
logL( jeh;Z))
2.4. Monte Carlo Experiments
In this section we demonstrate the performance of our two step approach with
two experiments. In the rst experiment we use non-parametric estimators, in the
second one we use parametric MLE estimators.
2.4.1. Non-parametric Monte Carlo
In the rst experiment in which we tested the non-parametric version of our two
step estimator, we assume that there are no covariates and auctions are homogenous.
We consider L = 400 auctions, which give us 400 informed and 400 uninformed
bids to estimate the distribution of the private signal. Our Monte Carlo experiment
consists of 1000 replications. The true distribution F of private signals of the informed
bidders is lognormal with location and scale parameters of 0 and 0:5;respectively. We
assume that the reservation price is 0:1. For each replication, we rst generate L
private signals from this distribution. We then generate the bids of the informed and
uninformed rms using the equilibrium bid functions 2.2 and 2.3.
Next, we apply the non-parametric version of our estimation procedure for each
replication. First we estimate the distribution and density functions of the uninformed
bid using 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. Second, we compute the pseudo private signals
following 2.1. Finally, from this pseudo private signal data we estimate the density
function of the private signal using 2.7.
47
As for the kernels used in estimation, we follow Guerre et al (2000). For Kg and
Kf we choose the triweight kernel such that Kg(u) = Kf (u) = 3532(1   u2)3. The
bandwidths are chosen as hg = 1:06bsbT  15b and hf = 1:06bshT  15h where bsb and bsh are
the estimated standard deviations of bids and pseudo signals, respectively. The factor
1:06 comes from the so-called rule of thumb (Hardle,1991).
The simulation program is written in MATLAB. In each replication we get three
estimated functions: the density and the distribution functions of the uninformed bid
and the density function of the private signal. Figure 2.1 displays the true density of
the private signal in plain line. For each evaluation point, the mean, 5% percentile
and 95% percentile of the 1000 estimates of bf() are plotted.
Figure 2.1. MC experiment with non-parametric estimation: true and
estimated distributions of private signal
As seen in Figure 2.1, the true density lies between the 5% and 95% percentiles
all over its support. Moreover, the mean of the estimated densities follow the true
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density very closely, with a slight bias. We conclude that our non-parametric two
stage estimator works fairly well in estimating the private signal distribution8.
2.4.2. Parametric Monte Carlo
In the second experiment we applied the parametric MLE estimators as explained
before. We run the experiment in OCS drainage auctions setting for which we have
data of covariates for the auctioned objects, which are the tracts in this case. We
proxy the private signal of the informed rm with the ex-post protability of the
tract, which is denoted by . This is dened as the discounted revenues less drilling
costs and less royalty payments. Our proxies for the public information variables, are
the average of the ex-post protability of the tract ( ) and of neighbor tracts (V ),
which is denoted by val9; the number of neighbor tracts (N); and tract acreage (a).
Therefore, we approximate Zt with the following
Z 0t = (1; valt; Nt; at)
8It is important to note that, our estimates are reliable in a certain interval on the support. This
is due to the fact that we are estimating a bounded distribution for the uninformed bid in the
rst stage, hence the parts of the distribution close to the boundaries are estimated with a bias
(points outside the interval [R+ hg; bmax   hg] .) In the second stage estimation, we exclude the
values of the pseudo private signals which correspond to these biased points coming from the rst
stage, as seen in Equation 2.6. Hence, estimates of the private value distribution outside the intervalheh(R+ hg) + hf ;eh(bmax   hg)  hfi are not reliable. In our Monte Carlo experiment, the average
of end points of this interval over the 1000 simulations gives us [0:3291; 2:3591].
9We found this average more explanatory than the average ex-post value of the neighbor tracts for
the bidding behavior of the non-neighbor rms. It is possible that the protability of the neighboring
tracts are not yet revealed at the time of the auction, yet the non-neighbor rms might be getting
more information about the tract from other resources which are not covered by the variables
included in this study.
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In this experiment we assumed tract specic characteristics are also stochastic. For
each of the covariates used in the experiment, we simply determined their underlying
distributions and dependency structure among them, then took random draws in
accordance with their stochastic nature. For val, we tted a normal distribution to
determine the mean and variance. For N and a10, we simply found their empirical
distributions. We tested for correlations, but we could not nd signicant relationship
between the covariates.
For the parametric Monte Carlo experiment, our sample size is L = 200 and the
simulation size is S = 1000. So, we simulate 1000 data samples of size 200.
We assume that the underlying distribution of the private signal H conditional on
the publicly available information Zt is lognormal, as Ft(htjZt) = log normal(2t; 2t )
where t is a linear function of the public information variables, and 
2 is a constant
as the following:
(2.8) t = 
0
2Zt = 21 + 22valt + 23Nt + 24at, 
2
t = 2
So, for tract t, we took random draws from the underlying distributions of the co-
variates val,N and a , and we assigned values to the parameters (21; 22; 23; 24; )11.
Then we calculate the parameters (2t; 2) of the lognormal distribution Ft(htjZt),
10Acreage takes several di¤erent values in our data sample. We determined the values that occure
most often, and built a discrete support form those.We found the empirical distribution of acreage
on this discrete support.
11We assigned the parameters  and  the values we got from the estimation of the same econometric
model with data from OCS auctions. We assigned the same parameter values for each tract and for
each simulation.
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according to the equation 2.8. After this, we drew a random private signal from this
distribution and applied equations 2.2 and 2.3 to get the simulated uninformed and
informed bids, bt and t, for tract t. We repeat this for t = 1; :::; L, and obtain one
simulated sample of size L. Finally, we replicate this simulation 1000 times to obtain
1000 simulated samples.
For each of the simulated samples in our experiment, which consisted of L un-
informed and L informed bids, we applied our two stage estimator explained in the
previous section, to see if it is able to recover the initially assumed parameters of
the private signal distribution F (hjZ). At the rst stage, the distribution of the
uninformed bids, G(bjZ) is assumed to be
Gt(btjZt) = log normal(1t; 21t)
where 1t = 
0
1Zt = 11 + 12valt + 13Nt + 14at and 
2
1t = 1.
We use the simulated uninformed bids bt and public information Zt in a maximum
likelihood estimation to obtain the parameters (11; 12; 13; 14; 1) of G(bjZ), hencebG. Then, we plug bG and bg in equation 2.1 to obtain the pseudo private signals eh.
Finally, using these pseudo private signals, we estimate the distribution of the private
signal F (hjZ) by MLE, assuming a lognormal specication with parameters linearly
dependant on the public information Z as the following:
Ft(btjZt) = log normal(2t; 22t)
where 2t = 
0
2Zt = 21 + 22valt + 23Nt + 24at and 
2
2t = 2.
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Finally, we take the average of the estimates from the 1000 simulated data samples
to arrive at the ultimate estimates of the parameters of the distribution of private
signal.
Table 2.1 gives the results of our parametric Monte Carlo experiment. We present
the mean of the estimated parameters of the private signal distribution from the 1000
simulated samples and the mean squared errors (MSEs) of estimations for sample
sizes of 50; 100; and 200 to get an idea about the asymptotic performance of our
estimator.
Table 2.1. Results of Monte Carlo experiment with parametric estimation
Ft(btjZt) = log normal(2t; 22t); 2t= 21 + 22valt+23Nt+24at and 22t= 2
Sample size 21 22 23 24 2
True parameters 7:4816 0:0237 0:4791 0:8528 5:3069
50 7:423 0:0237 0:476 0:8879 5:1239
Estimated parameters 100 7:4470 0:0243 0:486 0:8439 5:2351
200 7:4091 0:0235 0:494 0:8497 5:2896
50 25:8833 0:0005 0:4046 0:4183 0:2848
MSE 100 11:6398 0:0002 0:1822 0:1816 0:1457
200 5:7742 0:0001 0:092 0:0845 0:0679
As seen in Table 2.1, our two stage parametric estimator delivers pretty good
results. Estimated values of the parameters are fairly close to the true parameter
values. Moreover, the MSE of estimation decreases signicantly when we increase the
sample size in our simulations. Hence, we conclude that our two stage estimator is
performing better in larger samples.
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2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we show the identication and estimation of the private signal of
the informed bidder in a common value asymmetric information auction environment.
The critical assumptions in the model which leads to the identication result are the
single informed bidders signal being su¢ cient for the signal of the uninformed bidders.
By this way, winners curse correction does not interfere in his bid function, and his
private signal is identied.
We propose a two stage estimation method, which follows the identication of
the private signal. We test the performance of this estimator for non-parametric and
parametric cases with Monte Carlo experiments. In the non-parametric case, the true
density lies between the 5% and 95% percentile lines all over the support, and our
estimator performs well. In the parametric case, we can estimate the true parameters
very closely, with a decreasing mean square error as we increase the sample size.
So, our estimator performs better in terms of mean square error as the sample size
increases.
CHAPTER 3
An Empirical Application for OCS Drainage Leases
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the case of OCS Drainage Leases as an example
of the asymmetric information common value auction model, based on the work of
Hendricks and Porter (1988) (HP hereafter). The main purpose of this chapter is
to apply the estimation method developed in the previous chapter to estimate the
private signals of the informed bidders in the OCS drainage lease auctions, who are
the neighbor bidders in this case,and the underlying distribution for them. Since the
characteristics of the tracts and the other parameters at each auction are di¤erent,
we have to use covariates to account for these heterogeneities. As a result, we nd
it more convenient to use the parametric version of the two stage estimator proposed
in the previous chapter.
After estimating the underlying distribution of the private signals, we conduct a
counterfactual experiment for a symmetric information case. We simulate the bidding
game for the existing case of asymmetric information, in which there is one neighbor
bidder (who is more informed about the value of the auctioned drainage tract), and
a number of other non-neighbor bidders who have less precise information. We fol-
low the bidding model and equilibrium in HP in doing this. On the other side, we
simulate another bidding game where each bidder receives a signal about the value
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of the tract from the same distribution as the informed bidder, hence a symmetric
value environment. We base this simulation on the equilibrium of the symmetric in-
formation common value bidding game introduced by Smiley (1979). Smiley (1979)
shows that under certain conditions, the equilibrium bid function of this bidding game
is proportional to the signal. This result proves to be very practical for simulation
purposes.
We compare the results of the two di¤erent informational structures on the auction
revenue of the government. We nd that the government benets more from the
asymmetric informational structure among the bidders, when the tract value is low.
On the other hand, the probability that a symmetric information environment results
in higher government revenue is higher for high value tracts.
In section 2, we introduce the OCS drainage lease auctions and the data we
have. In section 3, we estimate the asymmetric information model and present the
results. In section 4, we discuss the counterfactual case of a symmetric information
model and we compare the e¤ects of the two informational structures in terms of the
governments auction revenue. Section 5 concludes this chapter.
3.2. OCS Mechanism and the Data
In this section, we apply the proposed estimation procedure to data of the federal
lands o¤ the coasts of Louisiana and Texas which were leased between 1959 and 1973.
Although we have data for a longer period, we restricted our study to this period
since some structural changes occurred in 19741. In the sample each lease is sold via
1In 1974 the eight biggest oil rms are banned from submitting joint bids. Moreover, prices get more
volatile starting from 1974.
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a rst price sealed bid auction. The winning bidder pays the amount he bid at the
time of the sale, which is called a bonus payment. One sixth of the revenues from
any oil or gas extracted accrue to the government on an annual basis as a royalty
payment. A nominal rental fee is paid by the rm each year until either the lease
expires or production begins. If no exploratory work is done after ve years have
elapsed, ownership of the lease reverts to the government. If su¢ cient amount of oil
and/or gas is discovered so that the rm begins producing, the lease is automatically
renewed for as long as it takes the rm to extract the hydrocarbons.
In the sample the reservation price that the government announced was $25 per
acre on most drainage leases. Additionally, it has the right to reject the high bid, if it
nds the bid too low compared to its own private estimate of the value of the tract.
The high bid was rejected in around %16 of the drainage tracts2.
For each tract in our dataset, we have the information on tract number, the date it
was auctioned. whether it was a wildcat or drainage tract, its location, tract acreage,
submitted bids, names of the bidder rms, its neighbor tracts; the rms which have
previously owned those neighbor tracts, the number and date of any wells that were
drilled; and annual production through1980 if any oil or gas was extracted
The data set also includes the ex-post tract values calculated by HP for each
tract3.
2HP uses the data from the auctioned drainage tracts between 1959 and 1969. High bid in 16%
of the drainage tract auctions in their data set was rejected. We assume there would be a slight
di¤erence in our case since we use a larger data set which includes HPs.
3Future production paths were converted into revenues by using the real wellhead prices at the date
of sale and discounting to the auction date at a 5% per annum rate. Cost data was obtained from
American Petroleum Institute, then subtracted from discounted revenues. See Hendricks, Porter
and Boudreau (1987) for details about how the ex-post values were calculated.
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HP indicates several facts against competitive bidding. In their data, HP found
74 tracts with multiple informed rms, but only 17 tracts had multiple informed bids.
Moreover, net prots were not signicantly lower on tracts with multiple informed
rms than on tracts with one informed rm, and the bid of informed rms were
strictly decreasing in the number of informed rms. Finally, the informed rms have
large positive prots implying large information rents, most of which would most
probably be eliminated if there were competition among informed bidders. All these
facts are also supported by the absence of a law prohibiting rms from forming a
bidding consortium. Therefore,on tracts where there are more than one informed bid
submitted, the maximum of these is taken as the coordinated bid of the informed
rms.
In our study, we include 69 tracts which were auctioned in drainage sales during
this period by the government and which have positive ex-post value as calculated
by HP. From the sample of 69 drainage tracts, 49 has more than one neighbor rm.
However, only 6 of these 49 tracts received more than one neighbor bid throughout
the sample period, conrming the nding of HP regarding the coordinated bidding
behavior of the neighbor rms. Therefore, we focus on the model with one informed
rm and an arbitrary number of uninformed rms, as in HPTable 3.1 gives a summary
of the data that is used in estimation of the parameters of the model.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
: maximum bid by neighbor 18:25 35:43 0 236:29
b: maximum bid by non-neighbor 14:77 26:08 0 179:89
N : number of neighbor tracts 7:39 1:3 4 9
: ex-post tract protability 52:6 66:57 0:011 295:98
V : average ex-post prot of neighbor tracts 32:37 47:08  6:65 194:51
a: tract acreage 2; 530 1; 337 0; 625 5; 544
Dollar gures are in millions of 1972 dollars.
3.3. Estimation
In the following estimation, we proxy the private signal of the neighbor rm with
the ex-post protability of the tract, which is denoted by . This is dened as the
discounted revenues less drilling costs and less royalty payments. Our proxies for
the public information variables, since we do not have the seismic survey data, are
the average of the ex-post protability of the tract () and of neighbor tracts (V ),
which is denoted by val4, the number of neighbor tracts (N), and tract acreage (a).
Therefore, we approximate Zt with the following
Z 0t = (valt; Nt; at)
In the rst stage of estimation, we assume that bt has lognormal distribution
conditional on the publicly available information, as the following
Gt(btjZt) = log normal(1t; 21t); where 1t = 01Zt and 21t = 1
4We found this average more explanatory than the average ex-post value of the neighbor tracts for
the bidding behavior of the non-neighbor rms. It is possible that the protability of the neighboring
tracts are not yet revealed at the time of the auction, yet the non-neighbor rms might be getting
more information about the tract from other resources which are not covered by the variables
included in this study.
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with 1t = 
0
1Zt = 11+12  valt+13 Nt+14  at is the log-scale parameter and
1 is the shape parameter of the lognormal density.
Looking at the equilibrium strategies, we see that G() is a piecewise distribution
function. Therefore, to estimate the parameters of G() we maximize the following
likelihood function:
logL1(1; 1jb;Z) =
TP
t=1
[I(bt > 0)  log((btjZt))+
I(bt  0)  log((restjZt))]
where  and  are the normal density and distribution functions respectively, and
rest is the reservation price used by the government at the auction for tract t. We
get the estimates of the parameters of the distribution of uninformed bids, G(), as
the following:
fb1; b1g = argmax
1;1
logL1(1; 1jb;Z)
Now that we have the maximum likelihood estimators bG() and bg() of G() and
g() respectively, we can plug them in equation 2.1 to nd the pseudo signal of the
informed bidder at tract t as the following:
eht = t + bG (t)bg(t)
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At the second stage of the estimation, we use these pseudo signals eht for all tracts
t = 1; :::; T to estimate the distribution of H conditional on the publicly available
information. We basically apply the same estimation method as in the rst stage and
assume that H has a lognormal distribution as the following:
Ft(htjZt) = log normal(2t; 22t); where 2t = 02Zt and 22t = 2
where 2t = 
0
2Zt = 21 + 22  valt + 23 Nt + 24  at is the log-scale parameter
and 2 is the shape parameter of the lognormal density. We estimate the parameters
of this density by maximizing the following likelihood:
logL2(2; 2jeh;Z) = TP
t=1
h
I(eht > bht)  log((ehtjZt))+
I(eht  rest)  log((restjZt))i
The estimates for the parameters 2 and 2 of the distribution of H are obtained
as the following:
fb2; b2g = argmax
2;2
logL2(2; 2jeh;Z)
Table 3.2 shows the e¤ect of the selected public information variables on parame-
ters of the lognormal distribution of non-neighbor bids. While average of the ex-post
values and the acreage of the tract have positive e¤ects on the location parameter
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, we see that as the number of neighbor tracts increase, the location parameter de-
creases. However, number of neighbor tracts seems to be an insignicant variable for
explaining the location of the non-neighbor bid distribution. Acreage of the tract has
a positive e¤ect, implying that the bigger the tract, the more value is expected from
that tract. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of the acreage is signicant at 1% level, while the
variable val is signicant at 10%. The scale parameter 2 is estimated to be highly
signicant and pretty large.
The estimated mean and standard deviation of the log-normal distribution of the
non-neighbor bids for a tract with average values of val, N and a are $10:64 millions
and $123 millions respectively.
Table 3.2. Results of rst stage estimation
1t = 
0
1Zt = 11 + 12  valt + 13 Nt + 14  at; 22t = 1
variable estimated parameter5 std. dev.
constant 14:81 1:58
val 0:012 0:007
N  0:23 0:22
a 0:58 0:22
22 2:21
 0:21
Log Likelihood  145:05
Table 3.3 gives the results from the second stage, in which we estimate the distri-
bution of the private signal using the pseudo private signals calculated at the end of
the rst stage.
We obtained the standard deviations of the parameters estimated at the end of
the second stage by bootstrap.
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Table 3.3. Results of second stage estimation
2t = 
0
2Zt = 21 + 22  valt + 23 Nt + 24  at; 22t = 2
variable estimated parameter std. dev.
constant 7:48 5:29
val 0:024 0:019
N 0:48 0:7
a 0:85 0:44
22 5:31
 0:51
Log Likelihood  158:38
We see that all the variables have positive e¤ect on the location parameter of
the log-normal distribution of the private signal, although only the acreage is weakly
signicant. The estimate for the scale parameter is signicant with a high value.
Next section gives the setting of a symmetric informational structure and investi-
gates the e¤ects of informational symmetry on the results of the bidding game.
3.4. A counterfactual simulation
3.4.1. The Symmetric Information Common Value Auction Model
In this part, we introduce the equilibrium of the bidding game in an environment
where all bidders receive signals from the same signal distribution as the neighbor
bidders do, i.e. symmetric information environment, as presented by Smiley (1979).
Then, we estimate distribution of the signal conditional on the value of the tract v,
F (hjv), whose parameters are in the equilibrium bid function.
Smiley (1979) has found that, under certain conditions, the equilibrium bid func-
tion of the symmetric information common value bidding game, s, is proportional to
the signal h as in
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(3.1) s(h) =   h
where the proportionality constant  depends on the parameters of the distribution
of h as well as the amount of competition. This result is especially useful in empirical
applications like this one because of the simplicity of calculating the equilibrium bid
function6. To obtain this result, Smiley (1979) gives the su¢ cient conditions upon
F (hjv) (the distribution of the signal conditional on value of the tract) and k(v) (the
prior belief of bidders about the distribution of the value of the tract) as the following:
(3.2) F (hjv) = F (hjv) for  > 0
and
(3.3) k(v) _ 1
v2
The homogeneity condition upon F (hjv) denes the way the distribution function
shifts as a result of shifts in v. The condition on the prior k(v) says that it is a neutral
prior.
6As shown in Paarsch (1992), the equilibrium bid function of the most general specication of the
common value symmetric information bidding game is a highly nonlinear function.
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Smiley (1979) has also shown that Gumbel, Log-Normal andWeibull specications
for F (hjv) satisfy condition 3.2, and lead to equilibrium bid function in the form of
3.1 under condition 3.3.
For the purpose of our symmetric information counterfactual simulation, we adopt
the Log-Normal specication for F (hjv _). Therefore, following Smiley (1979), we as-
sume the signal has a density function conditional on the value of the tract as in the
following:
f(hijv) = 1
hi3
p
2
exp
"
 (lnhi   ln v   3)
2
223
#
Since Smiley (1979) assumes that E(hijv) = v, 3 and 3 are related as in
(3.4) 3 =  
23
2
Consequently, it is shown that the proportionality constant  in the equilibrium
bid function 3.1 is equal to
(3.5)  =
e
2
3=2
R1
0
lnu
u
exp(  ln2 u)[1 +D(lnu)]nb 1duR1
0
u(3
p
2 1) lnu exp(  ln2 u)[1 +D(lnu)]nb 1du
where D(x) = 2p

R x
0
e u
2
du, and nb is the number of bidders in the auction.
In the parametric estimation section, we have estimated the parameters of F (hjZ);the
distribution of H conditional on the public signal Z. Here, we need to estimate the
64
parameter 23 of F (hjv), the distribution of H conditional on the value of the tract,
in order to nd the value of the proportionality constant  and use it in equation 3.1
to get equilibrium bids under the symmetric information scenario.
In estimating the parameters of the distribution F (hjv), we once again use the
pseudo private signals eh, which were calculated at the end of the rst stage of para-
metric estimation of F (hjZ). As the empirical counterpart of the value of the tract
v, we use the ex-post protability variable . We maximize the following likelihood
function:
logL3(3; 3jeh;) = TP
t=1
h
I(eht > 0)  log((lnehtjt))+
I(eht  0)  log((ln restjt))i
subject to the condition in equation 3.4.
The estimates for the parameters 3 and 3 of F (hjv) are obtained as the following:
b3 = argmaxb3 logL3(3; 
2
3
2
jeh;), b3 =  b232
3 is estimated to be b3 = 3:0292 with a standard error of 0:1314. It is plugged
in Equation 3.4 to get b3 =  4:5879.
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3.4.2. Simulation of the bidding game under two informational structures
Next, we simulate bidding game in symmetric and asymmetric information environ-
ments separately to compare the governments revenue under two di¤erent informa-
tional structures. In the OCS drainage lease auction setup, symmetric information
corresponds to a case where all bidders receive the private signal of the neighbor bid-
der for the auctioned tract. Asymmetric information environment corresponds to the
real case of OCS drainage auctions, which include both neighbor and non-neighbor
bidders.
3.4.2.1. Symmetric Information. We rst simulate the symmetric information
case. For each tract t in our sample of data, we calculate the proportionality constant
t by plugging b23 and number of bidders for tract t, nbt in equation 3.5. Then we
simulate 5000 symmetric information winning bids. The symmetric information is
signaled in the form of the ex-post protability of the tract, same as the private
signal of the neighbor bidder in the asymmetric information case.
To simulate 5000 winning bids for tract t, rst we draw nt signals from F (hjv)
with the estimated parameters b3 = 3:0292 and b3 =  4:5879, using the ex-post
protability t. Next, we multiply these nt draws of the signal with the proportion-
ality constant t to end up with nt symmetric information bids for tract t. We nd
the highest of the nt bids and record it as the winning bid, hence the government
revenue, for tract t. We repeat this procedure 5000 times to simulate 5000 winning
bids for tract t: Finally, we take the average of these 5000winning bids to record as
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the simulated symmetric information government revenue for tract t. We do this for
every tract in our sample.
3.4.2.2. Asymmetric Information. As for the asymmetric information case, for
each tract t in our sample of data, we rst simulate 5000 highest neighbor and 5000
highest non-neighbor bids using the estimated parameters in tables 2 and 3 respec-
tively. More specically, using the values of the covariates for tract t and estimated
coe¢ cients of those covariates, we calculate the parameters of the non-neigbor bid
distribution (e1; e1) and the private signal distribution (e2; e2). Then we draw values
from log normal(e1; e1) until we get 5000 simulated non-neighbor bids which are at
most as large as the highest non-neighbor bid in our data sample7.
In simulating the neighbor bids, we draw 5000 values from the estimated distri-
bution of the private signal, which are not greater than the highest pseudo private
signal (eh) we calculate at the end of the rst stage of estimation8.Then, we plug these
values in 2.3.
We end up having 5000 pairs of highest neighbor and non-neighbor bids. For each
pair, we take the higher one and record it as the government revenue. Finally, we
take the average of these 5000 government revenues and record it as the government
revenue in asymmetric information case for tract t. We do this for all the tracts in
our sample.
One important thing to notice is that, the 3 parameter in  (equation 3.5) ac-
counts for the uncertainty in the signal distribution. As shown in Smiley (1979), lim
3!0
7The reason for the truncation is explained in the following paragraphs.
8The reason for the truncation is explained in the following paragraphs.
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(3; nb) = 1, hence, when 3 = 0 , the bidder bids the signal he receives. When 3
is high, hence the precision of the signal is low and it is not trustworthy, the bidder
cuts down his bid signicantly. For example, for a tract with three bidders (the av-
erage number of bidders on a tract in our sample is 3:5), b3 = 3:0292 results in an
equilibrium bid of 1% of the signal received.
However, bid functions in the asymmetric information case in equation 2.3 and
especially equation 2.2 do not have the direct mechanism to respond to the level
of uncertainty in the signal distribution as we have in . Moreover, the variances
of the non-neighbor bid and the signal distributions are estimated to be very high.
Consequently we draw many values from the tails of these distributions. As a result,
asymmetric information simulation for the government revenue gives abnormally high
revenue levels, which are not quite comparable with what we have in our data and
what we get from the symmetric information simulation.
As a result, we found it necessary to draw from the trimmed non-neighbor bid and
trimmed private signal distributions for the asymmetric information case. We accept
the simulated non-neighbor bids and signals only if they are lower than or equal to
their highest sample counterparts.
3.4.3. Discussion of experiment results
Results with trimming are quite interesting. In 17 of the 69 tracts, the simulated
government revenue in symmetric information environment is higher than that in the
asymmetric information environment. 14 of these 17 tracts have an ex-post prof-
itability higher than the average ex-post protability of the tracts in our data set,
68
Figure 3.1. Simulated bids for a tract with value $16:3 million
which is $52:6 million in 1972 dollars.(Only 25 tracts have ex-post protability above
the average) This tells us that high valued tracts result in higher government revenue
with a higher probability when all bidders are informed, whereas low valued tracts
benet the government ,more often when there are both informed and uninformed
bidders in the auction.
In the case of low valued tracts, when all bidders are informed, the winning bid
hardly goes above the value of the tract. Less informed bidders in the asymmetric in-
formation simulation are driving the winning bid up above the symmetric information
government revenue.
The average value of the tracts in the data set is $52:6 million in 1972 dollars.
Figure 3.1 depict the kernel smoothing density estimates of the neighbor and non-
neighbor bids in the asymmetric information simulation and the bids in the symmetric
information simulation for a tract with a value of $16:3 million.
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As seen in the Figure 3.1, the non-neighbor bids of the asymmetric information
simulation have a higher mean (the sample mean of the 5000 simulated non-neighbor
bids is $116:8 millions), with a heavier tail and higher variance (the sample stan-
dard deviation of the non-neighbor bids is approximately ten times higher than that
of neighbor bids) when compared to the neighbor bids ( the sample mean of the
5000 simulated neighbor bids is $34:6 millions). In 3491 of the 5000 simulations for
this tract, the non-neighbor bid beats the neighbor bid, as expected looking at the
distributions of the bids.
More interestingly, the symmetric information simulation bids for the same tract
has a much thinner tail, hence having a sample mean of $9 millions. Their variance
is also much less than the bids in the asymmetric information case. The symmetric
information bid beats the winner of the asymmetric information case in only 754 of
the 5000 simulations.
For the low valued tracts, we can conclude the following: if there are both non-
neighbor and neighbor bidders in the auction, the non-neighbor bidder might be
bidding higher than the value of the tract due to the imprecision of public signal.
Actually, the seismic survey information which is available to every potential bidder
in the auction reveals the hydrocarbon potential of a very large area including the
auctioned tract. This can be misleading. On the other hand, when all the bidders
have the kind of information a neighbor bidder has, they make a much reliable guess
about the productivity of the tract, since they know the results of explorations done in
very close approximity of the auctioned tract. Therefore,they hardly bid higher than
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Figure 3.2. Simulated bids for a tract with value $125:7 million
the value of the tract. This results in a higher government revenue in the asymmetric
information case.
Next, we pick a tract with a value above the average tract value in the data set.
25 of the 69 tracts in our data set have higher ex-post value than the sample average.
In 14 of these 25 tracts, the symmetric information revenue of the government is
higher than that of the asymmetric information case. Hence, it is observed that the
government has a greater chance of getting higher revenue in a symmetric information
environment as the value of the tract increases.
In Figure 3.2, we depict the kernel smoothing density estimates of the neighbor
and non-neighbor bids in the asymmetric information simulation and the bids in
the symmetric information simulation for a tract with a value of $125:7 million. It is
observed that the sample mean of the 5000 simulated non-neighbor and neighbor bids
are $46 million and $27:4 million, respectively. The sample standard deviation of the
71
non-neighbor bids is almost three times higher than that of the neighbor bids. This
is also obvious from the thicker tail of the non-neighbor bid. In 3; 397 of the 5; 000
simulations for this tract, the non-neighbor bid beats the neighbor bid. This time,
the symmetric information revenue of the government is higher than the asymmetric
information revenue in 1551 of the 5000 simulations. This is more than double the
number for the low value tract. We conclude that, for a high valued tract, the
symmetric information bidders are better able to compete with the dispersed bids of
the non-neighbor bidders, when compared to the case in a low valued tract.
In conclusion, we observe that the non-neighbor bids being highly dispersed is the
primary determinant of the results of the counterfactual experiment. High variation
in the non-neighbor bids is expected due to the less informative signal (public signal)
non-neighbor bidders receive about the value of the tract. However, we nd the
estimated variance of the non-neighbor bids much higher than the levels it would be
expected. This results from the highly dispersed bid data we have from the OCS
auctions.
3.5. Conclusion
The OCS drainage lease auctions, as held by the Department of the Interior until
1982, are a very typical example of the asymmetric information common value auc-
tion model. In their empirical study, HP has revealed the facts and ndings for the
asymmetric information structure among the bidders of drainage leases for the period
1954 -1969. The previous chapter of this dissertation discusses the identication of
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private values in the asymmetric information common value auction models and pro-
poses the rst structural estimation method for this model in the literature. In this
chapter, we apply this method to estimate the structural parameters of underlying
distribution of signals of the neighbor bidders in the auctions of OCS drainage leases
between 1954 and 1972. Having estimating the structural parameters, we run coun-
terfactual simulations to see how the governments auction revenue would be e¤ected
were the bidders symmetrically informed.
We nd that the revenue in the asymmetric information case is signicantly above
the revenue in symmetric information case for low value tracts. As the tract value
increases, the symmetric information revenue starts to beat the asymmetric informa-
tion revenue more often. This is explained with the nding that non-neighbor bidders
in an asymmetric information environment bid with high variation and low precision
(which leads to signicant negative prots for them most of the time) when compared
to symmetric information bidders. We expect the non-neighbor bids to be dispersed
due to the less informative nature of the public signal, only which they have access
to. However, the extremely high variations in their bids seen in the simulated data is
a result of the dispersed data we have from the OCS auctions.
CHAPTER 4
An Empirical Analysis of ERCOT Balancing Market
4.1. Introduction
The electricity spot market auctions have been analyzed extensively in the lit-
erature. A wide variety of models based on varying behavioral assumptions, have
been used. Klemperer and Meyers (1989) supply function equilibrium (SFE) model
has been regarded as a good model of electricity spot markets, since it captures the
underlying structure of the market well. This model is based on the idea that under
demand uncertainty, a strategy in the form of a supply function (multiple price-
quantity pairs) constitute the optimal strategy (as opposed to a single price-quantity
pair strategy) There has been many applications of this model to predict market
performance. Green and Newbery (1992), Newbery (1998) and Green (1999) apply
supply function equilibrium model to predict markups in England and Whales whole-
sale electricity. Another model that has been a good base for the investigation of the
spot market auctions is the divisible good (share) auction theory. Hortacsu and Puller
(2008) is one of the recent studies building its analytical approach on Wilson (1979),
which is a seminal work in the share auctions literature.
While asymmetric environments have proved to be di¢ cult to analyze, for the spot
market auctions, it is essential to consider models in which di¤erent bidders exhibit
di¤erent characteristics. For example, investment decisions will generate asymmetries
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endogenously even if the generator rms start out as ex-ante symmetric. Important
asymmetries that a¤ect the positions of the bidders in the market and their strategies
signicantly are their cost structures and forward contract quantities. Wolak (2000)
develops a methodology that yields insight about generation unit level cost functions
using the bid and the contracted quantity data from the National Electricity Market
(NEM1) in Australia. He shows that contract obligations signicantly a¤ect bidders
incentives to exercise market power. De Frutos and Fabra (2008) found that the
scope of contracts to improve market performance crucially depends on both their
volume and distribution across rms. Therefore inference about this asymmetry about
the participants of the market should give enormous insight about strategies of the
players and resulting prices that are being observed in the market currently. In their
study investigating the performance of the bidders in spot BES market of ERCOT,
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) also treat the contract quantity of bidders as private
information and they use a behavioral assumption to identify the contract positions
of bidders. Sioshansi and Oren (2007) rst calculate the ex-post optimal supply
functions of rms in the BES market of ERCOT, then pick the bidders who bid
closest to their ex-post optimal supply functions. They then derive the more general
Nash Equilibrium set of ex-ante optimal supply functions and they test if the behavior
of those bidders satisfy a Nash Equilibrium. Niu, Baldick and Zhu (2005) propose a
linear asymmetric SFE model of the BES with transmission constraints to develop
rmsoptimal bidding strategies considering forward contracts, and they evaluate the
market power mitigation e¤ects of forward contracts.
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In this study, we work on Hortacsu and Puller (2008)s share auction model of
the BES market in ERCOT. Hortacsu and Puller (2008) has assumed that the supply
schedules of bidders are additively separable. They also have built the marginal cost
functions of the bidders using the heat rate and fuel information of plants. Using
the additive separability assumption and the marginal cost information they nd the
optimal supply schedules implied by their model very conveniently. Moreover, they
determine the contract quantities of bidders using a behavioral assumption, which
is basically derived from the rst order optimality condition of the biddersprot
maximization problem.
First point to notice in Hortacsu and Pullers solution is that their assumption
of additive separability is an a priori restriction imposed on the supply schedules. In
our study, we do not assume any functional form for the supply schedules. Then,
we use a resampling based estimation technique to infer belief of bidders regarding
the distribution of the market clearing price given their contract quantity and bid.
This, then, enables us to use the rst order optimality condition to nd the implied
marginal cost of the bidders.
One good aspect of the resampling based estimation we conduct is that we do not
need to pool data from di¤erent auctions on di¤erent hours or di¤erent days. As a
result, we do not need to control for in our estimation the changing factors between
di¤erent auctions. A potential shortcoming of not imposing any structure on the
supply schedules is that the implied marginal costs are not necessarily monotone
functions, which is actually the expected in the electricity industry.
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Second thing we point out in Hortacsu and Puller (2008) is that they assume
that the bidders behave according to the rst order optimality condition to nd their
contract quantities. Then, they use these quantities to build the biddersoptimal
supply schedules, which ends up conicting the former behavioral assumption to nd
the contract quantities. In our study of the BES, we approach the model from a
di¤erent direction. We assume at the very beginning that only the largest bidders
in the market behave according to our model, which is supported by the ndings of
previous studies on the BES market of ERCOT. Then, using the optimality condition,
we nd the implied marginal cost structure of the largest bidders. Finally, we compare
these implied marginal costs with the marginal cost schedules we build based on the
heat rate and fuel type information of these bidders.
So, in this study, our purpose is to analyze the behavior of bidders in BES market
with less restrictive and more consistent assumptions.
The rest of this chapter continues as the following. In section 2, we talk about the
general characteristics of power markets, ERCOT and the Balancing Energy Services
market of ERCOT. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 explains the resampling
based estimator we apply to the bid data to infer the belief of bidders regarding
the equilibrium price, and our empirical strategy. Section 5 introduces the data,
and explains how we build the cost functions. Section 6 discusses results of the
estimation,compares the actual costs to the estimated marginal costs of the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium of the model. and concludes.
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4.2. Power Markets, ERCOT and Balancing Energy Services Auctions
One of the main factors that guided the restructuring of the electricity power
industry was the concerns about reliability of the power supply. While the authori-
ties aimed at pushing the decisions and risks associated with electricity generation,
distribution and retailing to the market, reliability concerns always required some
structure to be imposed upon the system.
It is the characteristics of the electricity supply and demand that renders this
industry impossible to operate reliably as a deregulated industry with competitive
supply. These characteristics can be listed as (a) large variations in demand over the
course of a year; (b) nonstorability of electricity; (c) the need to physically balance
supply and demand at every point on the network continuously to meet physical
constraints on voltage, frequency, and stability; (d) the inability to control power
ows to most individual consumers; (e) limited use of real time pricing by retail
consumers, and (f) that even under the best of circumstances (i.e. with e¤ective real
time pricing of energy and operating reserves) non-price mechanisms (blackouts) will
have to be relied upon from time to time to ration imbalances between supply and
demand to meet physical operating reliability criteria because markets cannot clear
fast enough to do so1 (Joskow, 2006).
The term reliability is dened by the NERC (National Electricity Reliability
Council) as "the degree to which the performance of the elements of the technical
1In response to questions about why demand response was not relied upon to respond to the sudden
loss of 1; 100 MWs of generating capacity that led to rolling blackouts in Texas on April 17, 2006,
a representative of the ISO is reported to have said: In this case, when four generators tripped, it
was just bang-bang-bang-bang.Electric Transmission Week, April 24, 2006, pages 1 and 12, SNL
Financial LC.
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system results in power being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and
in the amount desired", which can be decomposed into the two aspects of the elec-
tricity system: security and adequacy. Security describes the ability of the system
to withstand disturbances (contingencies), and is provided by means of protection
devices and operation standards and procedures that include security constraint dis-
patch and the requirement for ancillary services such as voltage support, regulation
capacity, spinning reserves, black start capability, etc. The notion of generation ade-
quacy on the other hand represents the systems ability to meet demand, on a longer
time scale basis, considering the inherent uctuation and uncertainty in demand and
supply, the nonstorability of power and the long lead time for capacity expansion.
Although quality and the quantity of the existing generation capacity sets the
stage for the operation of the electricity markets, design of the market to facilitate
demand response and the spot market are also crucial for provision of a reliable
services.
4.2.1. ERCOT
ERCOT is the independent system operator (ISO) overseeing majority of Southern
and Central Texas. The area operated by ERCOT is named as the ERCOT region.
ERCOT covers the 85% of the load in Texas. ERCOT region has about 23 million
consumers, 550 generating units with total generation capacity of 84; 000 MW. Mar-
ket. There are approximately 1; 150 active market participants which generate, move,
buy, sell or use wholesale electricity2.
2ERCOT Quick Facts. Retrieved from ercot.com on 2.13.2012.
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In 1996, PUCT endorsed ERCOT to become an ISO to oversee the equitable access
to the power grid among the competitive market participants. This made ERCOT the
rst ISO in the US. When the Texas Legislature restructured the Texas electric market
in 1999 by unbundling the investor owned utilities and creating retail customer choice,
ERCOT was assigned four primary responsibilities: System reliability (planning and
operations), open access to transmission, retail switching process for customer choice,
wholesale market settlement for electricity production and delivery.
ERCOT employs an energy-only market design. Unlike markets with capacity
market design, which have a long term capacity market where the resources are paid
xed capacity payments during the year regardless of the relationship of supply and
demand, the purpose of the energy-only market design is to allow energy prices to rise
signicantly during shortage conditions. This way, appropriate price signal is provided
for demand response and new investment, when the available supply is insu¢ cient to
meet both energy and minimum operating reserve requirements.
Pricing of the electricity consumption is a vital part of the debate between the
competing wholesale electricity market designs for resource adequacy. A series of pa-
pers by Borenstein investigate the e¤ects of various types of real time pricing mecha-
nisms on peak demand, spot market prices, investment on electricity generation and
e¢ ciency of generation3.
The importance of price elastic customers (demand response) is emphasized in
an energy-only market design. In energy only markets, at least some price elastic
3See forexample Borenstein (2005a, 2005b and 2010)
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consumers are required for price to clear the market when capacity constraint binds;
otherwise non-price rationing could result in the form of blackouts.
The other part of the energy-only market design of ERCOT that allows the market
participants to respond to scarcity conditions is the Balancing Energy Services (BES)
market. In the BES market, expectation of high prices during shortage conditions and
the frequency of the occurrence of shortage conditions attract new capacity investment
in the market. The higher the electricity price in shortage conditions, the lower the
frequency of shortages. In this way, system is expected to settle down at the capacity
level which results in the optimal frequency of power shortages.
4.2.1.1. Demand Response. Ability of the demand side to respond to the prices or
scarcities eases the provision of system security and resource adequacy. Withdrawal
of demand at times of scarcity or peaking price acts as additional resource connected
to the system So, demand response provides cheaper security and adequacy mea-
sures. In the long run, demand response is also expected to decrease the power costs
of industrial and residential customers due to decreased costs of investments for reli-
ability measures (which are practically passed on to the consumers in a competitive
retail electricity sector)
Prior to the introduction of retail competition in January 2002, ERCOT relied
upon 3500 MW of interruptible load, group load curtailment programs, residential
direct load control, and other load management programs to maintain reliability.
With the redesign of the ERCOTmarket between 1999 and 2001 to foster competition,
the market lost a planning reserve resource of nearly 3000MW, and participants were
left confused over who would assume responsibility for overall resource adequacy.
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PUCT requires ERCOT to integrate back the existing demand response potential
systematically into the market. While debates in ERCOT about the appropriate role
of demand response is going on, there is agreement with the general principle that
demand side resources should be permitted to compete with generation resources to
the extend that the demand side resource can provide a service similar to the service
supplied by generator resources (Zarnikau, 2010).
In todays ERCOT design, demand response can participate in the market un-
der three categories: Loads acting as a Resource (LaaR): commercial and industrial
customers with interruptible loads that can meet certain performance requirements
can qualify to become Load Resources and provide operating reserves in the ERCOT
ancillary services (AS) markets. In the AS markets, the value of a Load Resources
load reduction is equal to that of an increase in generation by a generating plant.
Load Resources that are scheduled or selected in the ERCOT Day-Ahead AS Mar-
kets are eligible to receive a capacity payment regardless of whether they are actually
curtailed.
Emergency Interruptible Load Service (EILS): ERCOT procures (EILS) by select-
ing qualied loads to make themselves available for interruption in an electric grid
emergency. EILS is an emergency load reduction service designed to decrease the
likelihood of the need for rm load shedding (a.k.a, rolling blackouts). Customers
meeting EILS criteria may bid to provide the service through their qualied sched-
uling entities (QSEs). Voluntary Load Response: refers to a customers deviation
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from its scheduled or anticipated load level in response to price signals (e.g., balanc-
ing energy prices or peak demand periods) in situations where the customer has not
formally o¤ered its response to the market as a resource.
In 2010, over 2; 200 MW of capacity were qualied as LaaRs. These resources
regularly provided reserves in the responsive reserves market, but never participated
in the balancing energy market4.
These opportunities are available mostly to industry level customers. Industry
level customers make around one fourth of the total load in the ERCOT region. The
rest of the load belongs to residential customers. Demand response in the residential
customer level is only possible if the LSEs o¤er real time tari¤s to their customers.
4.2.1.2. Spot Market. A vast majority of the power transactions in the United
States take place in the form of bilateral contracts between agents in the electricity
industry. (In the ERCOT region, around 95% of the power is sold through bilateral
contracts). However, with such limited demand response, it is the spot market (the
Balancing Energy Services market as named in ERCOT) that provides the needed
exibility to the system which results from real time demand uncertainty. Unexpect-
edly high levels of demand occurring at a point in time creates scarcity. Generators,
who are willing to provide the demanded power at that point in time at the lowest
price are called to do so. The design of the spot market should allow the bidders
to cover their costs and make a reasonable amount of prot, while not letting them
exploit the scarcity and charge extremely high prices. Another target that the spot
42010 State of the Market Report for the ERCOT Wholesale Electricity Markets, August 2011,
Potomac Economics, Ltd. (Independent Market Monitor for the ERCOT Wholesale Market)
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market design is expected to achieve is to provide necessary price signals for the
building of the new generation capacity, so that shortage conditions in the system do
not occur more often than the optimal frequency. Bilaterally contracted quantities of
generation rms, types and level of available capacity ,and existing regulations like
price caps are some of the factors that a¤ect the performance of the spot market
crucially.
In this chapter we analyze the performance of bidders in the electricity spot market
in Texas. We use the hourly bid data from BES to nd biddersmarginal costs implied
by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium model. Then we compare their actual costs to the
estimated costs.
4.2.2. Bidding in ERCOTs Balancing Energy Services Market
Majority of power transactions in ERCOT take place in the form of bilateral con-
tracts in an "over the counter" market. Contract quantities and prices are private
information to the rms. However, between 2% to 5% of the power transactions take
place at the Balancing Energy Services market. This is the market overseen by the
independent system operator ERCOT to assure the real time balancing of supply and
perfectly inelastic demand.
In the Day-AheadMarket, which occurs one day before the demand and generation
for a specic time, each market participant submits their generation schedules and
forecasted load schedules for the next day, through a qualied scheduling entity (QSE)
to ERCOT. The submitted generation schedules do not need to be balanced in the
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sense that they do not need to match submittersbilateral contract amounts5.Then,
BES bids can be submitted or changed until one hour before the hour for which the
bids are submitted. BES participants can submit at most 20 monotonically increasing
price-quantity pairs to increase (Up Balancing Energy Services, UBES in ERCOTs
terms) and 20 monotonically increasing pairs to decrease (Down Balancing Energy
Services, DBES) their scheduled quantities in the day-ahead market.
ERCOT aggregates all the bids. Every fteen minutes, ERCOT observes the
realized demand and calls bidders to generate the power they have bid at the current
market clearing price. Market is cleared this way four times during the hour, but
bidders submit one bid for the whole hour.
Although the main purpose of the BES market is to assure the real time balanc-
ing of generation and load in the case of unexpected events like generator outages
and extremely hot or cold weather, since rms are not required to submit balanced
schedules in the day-ahead market, they may be strategically planning to fulll their
contract obligations by purchasing some power in the BES. If at the end of the BES
market for a 15 minute interval, if a rms total generation is short of its obliga-
tion, then it purchases the missing generation amount from the market at the market
clearing price. On the other hand, rms who exceed their obligations sell their excess
generation at that price. Load serving entities can also purchase the power they need
if they have not already secured it through bilateral contracts with power generators.
5Until mid 2002, ERCOT required market participants to submit balanced schedules to prevent
them from using the BES to purchase their base-load.
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In case rms over schedule at the day ahead market, Public Utility Commission
of Texas (PUCT) wants to make sure that they are available to decrease their supply
at the BES market. In order to facilitate this, PUCT has imposed a regulation on the
rms telling that they have to o¤er at least 15% of their scheduled energy to DBES
at any price within the o¤er caps6. However, it is voluntary to participate in UBES.
Power generating companies have a good amount of information about their com-
petitors. First, in Texas, power plants have similar production technologies. Data on
fuel e¢ ciency of each generation plant is publicly available. Therefore, cost structures
of each market participant can be estimated with a very good precision. Second, com-
petitors can purchase information on real time online-o­ ine status of each generator
in the market. (Hortacsu and Puller (2008)) This helps them guess their competitors
bids, and develop bidding strategies. Finally, the aggregated bids in the BES are made
publicly available after a certain time. Therefore, bidders can deduce their residual
demand curves by subtracting their own bid from the aggregated supply schedule.
Since bidders participate in the BES market repeatedly, bidders can get a very good
idea about the shape of their residual demand curve to the extend that the strategies
of competitors and the other conditions in the market do not change.
One important unknown to the bidders in the market is the contract quantities
of their competitors. As shown by Wolak (2000), contract position is a strong de-
terminant for market power incentives of participants. Contract positions constitute
6System wide o¤er cap was $1; 500 per MWh starting from March 1, 2007. It was increased to
$2; 250 per MWh on March 1, 2008.With the switch from zonal to nodal market on December 1,
2010, the o¤er cap was increased to $3000 per MWh.
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the private information of bidders, which play a signicant role in determining their
strategies.
4.3. A Multi-Unit Auction Model of BES Market
We adopt Hortacsu and Puller (2008)s model of the BES auctions in ERCOT.
We assume there areN bidder rms in the market. fCit(q); i = 1; :::; Ng represent
the cost of generating q amount of electricity at time t for a bidder i in the auction.
Demand is assumed to be the sum of a deterministic price elastic component and a
stochastic constant term as
eDt(p) = Dt(p) + "t
for the sake of generality, although we will work with a price inelastic demand in our
application.
QCit is the amount rm i has contracted to generate at time t in previous bilateral
agreements with other agents in the power market. The price of this contracted
quantity is PCit.
In each time period (auction) t, each rm submits a supply schedule Sit(p;QCit _).
We assume that the supply schedules are continuously di¤erentiable and have bounded
derivatives.
The auctioneer aggregates the simultaneously submitted supply schedules for time
t and nds the market clearing price pct given as
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(4.1)
NX
i=1
Sit(p
c
t ; QCit
_) = eDt(pct)
Due to the uniform price rule in the BES auctions, rms are paid market clearing
price times the quantity they have bid at that price: Sit(pct ; QCit _)p
c
t . Therefore, after
realization of the market clearing price, rms get the following ex-post prot:
it = Sit(p
c
t ; QCit
_)pct   Cit(Sit(pct))  (pct   PCit)QCit
The submitted quantities at di¤erent prices have to include the contracted quan-
tity QCit: Since these quantities were contracted to be delivered at an agreed upon
price PCit, the bidder i has to reimburse the di¤erence pct PCit back to its customer
for all the contracted quantity (assuming market clearing price is higher than the
contract price. ). Hence the term (pct   PCit)QCit is subtracted from total prot. (If
the market clearing price pct is lower than the contracted price PCit, this will be an
extra charge rather than a reimbursement.)
From the point of view of bidder i, the market clearing price pct is the most
important source of uncertainty. A bidder cannot foresee the market clearing price
because of two things that he does not know: rst, bidders cannot know for certain
what the exact demand is going to be at time t; second, bidders cannot know what
their rivals are bidding for time t: no one knows each others contract quantity.
It is important to note that, it would be possible to guess each others strategy
if contract quantities were public information, due to the fact that costs are fairly
88
well known in the electricity market. Therefore, the market demand eDt and the
unobserved components of the rivals prot maximization problems which are the
contract positions and prices of rival rms f(QCjt; PCjt); j 2  ig , are the main
sources of uncertainty for bidder i.
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) dene a probability measure over the realizations of
the market clearing price from the perspective of bidder i, to characterize a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. This probability measure is conditional on QCit, which is a private
information of bidder i, and bidder is supply schedule bSit(p). The rivals of bidder i
are assumed to play their equilibrium strategies fSjt(p;QCjt); j 2  ig.
Hit(p; bSit(p)jQCit)  Pr(pct  pjQCit; bSit(p))
Utilizing the fact that pct  p is possible only if there is excess supply at price p,
we can write
Hit(pjbSit(p); QCit) = Pr X
j2 i
Sjt(p;QCjt) + bSit(p)  eDt(p)jQCit; bSit(p)!
=
Z
QC itx"t
1
(X
j2 i
Sjt(p;QCjt) + bSit(p)  Dt(p) + "t) dF (QC it; "tjQCit)
using the denition of the market clearing price in Equation 4.1. F (QC it; "tjQCit)
is the joint distribution of the contract quantities of rivals of rm i and the demand
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noise "t conditional on the contract quantity of rm i. Note that Hit(pjbSit(p); QCit)
is the belief of bidder i about the distribution of the market clearing price.
The expected utility maximization problem of bidder i for a general utility for-
mulation which can take on both risk averse and risk neutral forms is written as the
following:
maxbSit(p).
pZ
p
U

pbSit(p)  Cit(bSit(p))  (p  PCit)QCit dHit(pjbSit(p); QCit)
Note that the expectation is taken over all possible realizations of the market
clearing price with respect to the probability density dHit(pjbSit(p); QCit). It is im-
portant to point out here that other bidderscontract positions are not in bidder is
objective function. Hence, Hortacsu and Puller (2008) do not model this environment
as a common value auction.
Hortacsu and Puller (2005) shows that the Euler-Lagrange necessary condition
for the pointwise optimality of the supply schedule Sit(p) is given by
(4.2) p  C 0it(Sit(p)) = (Sit(p) QCit)
Hs(pjSit(p); QCit)
Hp(pjSit(p); QCit)
7
where
Hp(pjSit(p); QCit) =
@
@p
Pr(pct  pjQCit; Sit(p))
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Hs(pjSit(p); QCit) =
@
@S
Pr(pct  pjQCit; Sit(p))
Hp(pjSit(p); QCit) is the density of the market clearing price when rm i submits
the supply schedule Sit(p), while Hs(pjSit(p); QCit) denotes how much the probability
distribution of the market clearing price shifts when bidder i shifts its supply Sit(p).
Note that this term is always non-negative8.
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) point out to the following observations from Equation
4.2:
 HS can be seen as an expression that captures the market power of bidder _i:
the more bidder i can shift the distribution of the market clearing price with
his supply schedule, the more market power he has.
 If we see Equation 4.2 as a markup expression, the markup bidder i makes
depends on the market power of bidder i: as HS ! 0, price equals marginal
cost.
 When bidder i is a net buyer (Sit(p) < QCit), i.e. it has to purchase power
from other agents to fulll its contract requirements, then it bids below
marginal cost.
 Moreover, Sit(p)   QCit = 0 implies p = C 0it(Sit(p)). In other words, at the
quantity level which exactly covers its contract quantity, bidder i bids its
marginal cost.
Next, we discuss how the contract quantities of rms can be inferred.
8An increase in Sit(p) weakly decreases the market clearing price, which in turn increases the prob-
ability that the market clearing price is less than price p.
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4.3.1. Unobserved contract quantities
It is proposed by Hortacsu and Puller (2008) that if C
0
it(S

it(p)) is observed, the con-
tract quantity of bidder i can be found at the intersection of its marginal cost and
supply schedule. This is a direct result of the last observation at the end of the previ-
ous section. This can be interpreted as when bidders are optimizing their strategies,
at their contract quantity level, they bid their marginal cost. Also, when a bidder
is short of its contract quantity, it bids below its marginal cost. When bidding for
production above its contracted level, the bidders bids above its marginal cost.
However, one should keep in mind that Equation 4.2 is the conclusion of a model of
strategic behavior. Therefore, Hortacsu and Puller (2008) nd the contract quantity
bidders assuming that they behave according to their model. However, they later use
this contract quantity to nd the optimal bidding strategies of the bidders. At this
point, we agree with Oren and Sioshansi (2007) arguing that since their aim is to
analyze the extent to which rm behavior is consistent with the model, they would
prefer a contract quantity estimate which does not require them to assume that agents
behave as dictated by the model. So, they follow Niu et al (2005) and simply assume
that the contract quantity of a bidder is equal to quantity it scheduled at the day
ahead market.
In this study, we aim to nd the implied marginal costs of bidders using the
optimality condition. For every price-quantity pair bid by a power generator, we can
solve for the marginal cost of generating that marginal quantity assuming that we
have the contract quantity information and the supply and price derivatives of H.
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However, since we use Equation 4.2 for nding the marginal costs, contract quantity
of a rm remains unidentied. However, we need this contract quantity information
to estimate the implied marginal cost levels, as will be explained in the next section.
As a result, we follow Niu et al (2005) in assuming that the bidders exactly cover
their contracted level of production in their day ahead market schedule. Therefore,
contract quantity of bidders is equal to their day ahead market schedule9.
4.4. Finding the marginal cost functions implied by the model
Note that if we assume that the bids we observe in the data are generated by a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the uniform price multi-unit auction game satisfying the
necessary condition in Equation 4.2, we can non-parametrically identify the marginal
cost functions of the bidders up to their contract quantity. Once we plug the bid
of bidder i and its contract quantity at a specic auction t, in Equation 4.2,what
remains to calculate the marginal cost function Cit(bSit(p)) is Hit(p; bSit(p)jQCit), the
belief of bidder i about the distribution of market clearing price pct conditional on his
private information and strategy, and its derivatives with respect to S and p.
Hortacsu and Puller (2008) walk around the need to estimate H by restricting
the functional form of the supply function strategies to a class of strategies that are
additively separable in the private information possessed by bidders: Si(p;QCi _) =
i(p) + i(QCi). They show that under this restriction, Equation 4.2 takes the
form p   C 0it(Sit(p)) = S

i (p;QCi) QCi
 RD0i(p)
where RD
0
i(p) is the price derivative of the
9Throughout the analyses, we will also look at the implications of Hortacsu and Puller (2008)s as-
sumption regarding the contract quantity. After all, they argue that talks with industry professionals
also conrm that bidders bid lower than their MC when they are short of their contract quantity,
and higher than their MC when they are bidding for quantities higher than their contract quantity.
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ex-post realization of the residual demand curve, which is faced by bidder i , and
RD
0
i(p) = D
0
(p)  P
j 6=i

0
j(p
_). In summary, since demand is also additively separable
in its random component ", residual demand, which is the di¤erence between the
demand and the aggregated supply schedules of rival rms, is additively separable in
private information of rivals (QCj) and the random component of the demand (").
Therefore, in the expression for the price derivative of the residual demand, there
is no " or QCj, which implies that knowing what the rivals have bid, or what the
realized value of " is, does not change the strategy of a given bidder. In other words,
what is ex-ante optimal is also ex-post optimal. So, Hortacsu and Puller (2008) can
calculate the ex-post optimal supply schedule Sit(p;QCit) for a given cost function
and the realized residual demand.
Although this is a very convenient way of nding the optimal supply schedules,
additive separability is an a priori restriction on the supply functions. Hortacsu
and Puller (2008) test this restriction by regressing the slope of a linear t of the
calculated supply schedules on the calculated contract quantity of bidders and some
other variables in a panel regression model. They nd that the contract quantity is
signicant at 5% level, although the economic impact of the contract quantity on the
slope is very little. When they also control for the auction xed e¤ects in their panel
regression, the economic and statistical signicance diminishes. However, regressions
for individual rms reveal that additive separability is violated by some rms, while
some satisfy this restriction. They nd that rms who perform best in terms of
protability benchmarks come close to satisfying additive separability (for example
Reliant, which operates under the name NRG now). On the other hand, there are
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also rms for which the variation in contract quantity explains 50% of the variation
in bid function slope. In conclusion, they have heterogenous results from the testing
of additive separability restriction.
As a result, we would like to proceed with no restrictive assumptions on the func-
tional form of the supply schedules to nd the marginal costs implied by optimality.
We estimate H and plug it in the rst order optimality condition together with the
supply schedules submitted by the bidders and the day ahead scheduled quantity as
the contract quantity to solve for the marginal cost functions of bidders. One point
to keep in mind is that a potential consequence of not imposing any functional forms
on the supply schedules is that the estimated marginal costs may not come up as
non-decreasing functions. Next, we elaborate on the identication and estimation of
H.
4.4.1. Identication of market clearing price distribution H
We follow the empirical strategy used in Hortacsu (2000), which estimates the valu-
ations of bidders in a divisible good auction model of the Turkish treasury bills.
First, we discuss identication of the distribution of the market clearing price from
the bid and demand data. Let G(p; S) be the probability that at a given price p, the
quantity S is less than or equal to the stochastic residual demand faced by bidder i:
G(p; S) = Pr(S  eD  X
j 6=i
Sj(p;QCj))
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Note that if we can estimate the joint distribution of the bids of rivals of bidder i
and the stochastic demand from the data, we could estimate G for all p and S pairs.
This probability is also equal to the probability of market clearing price being less
than or equal to a given price p, when the quantity bid at the price p by bidder i is
S:
(4.3) Hit(pjSit(p); QCit) = Gi(p; S)jS=bSit(p)
Therefore, the distribution of the market clearing price pct is identied if we can
estimate the G(p; S) using the bid and the demand data.
4.4.2. Empirical Strategy
In the equilibrium, bidder i knows its rivalsbid schedules up to their contract posi-
tions QC i (since each rmscost structure is well known due to the regulations in the
electricity market, contract positions are the only unknown to bidder i). Therefore,
assuming that the contract positions have a distribution which is common knowledge
to all market participants, the residual demand faced by bidder i is a function of the
N  1 random variables, QC i and the stochastic demand. eD. Therefore, bidder i can
get a good inference about the distribution of the residual demand by repeating the
following procedure many times: take N   1 random draws from the distribution of
the contract positions and evaluate the rivalsbids. Take a random draw from the
distribution of the demand. Take the di¤erence of the demand and the aggregated
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bids of rivals. Find the market clearing price at the intersection of the residual de-
mand and bidder is supply function. Looking at the empirical distribution of the
market clearing prices simulated in this way gives a good idea to bidder i about the
distribution of the market clearing price.
In our application to the BES auctions in ERCOT, we do not know the distribution
of the contract positions or the functional form that links the contract position to the
supply function. However, if we assume that
(1) the contract positions QCit, i = 1; :::; N are distributed iid
(2) the supply function strategies of bidders are symmetric10
(3) the contract positions QCit, i = 1; :::; N and the random component of the
demand "t are independent11,
then, we can apply this logic to simulate market clearing prices by resampling from
the bid data and drawing from the demand distribution, which can be estimated from
the demand data that we have. We propose the following resampling procedure12:
10Note that we do not impose a specic functional form, which is the case in Hortacsu and Puller
(2008). They restrict the supply functions to a class of additively separable functions to simplify
the rst order condition in Equation 4.2.
11The contract quantites QCit are generally determined long before the spot market for time t opens.
On the other hand, bidders have to bid in the BES as late as only 1 hour before the realization of the
demand. With the highly developed forecasting techniques, bidders can forecast the demand with
very little error within one hour of its realization. Therefore, the random component of the demandeD(p) = D(p) + "t is due to last minute changes in the conditions of the market like the weather. As
a result, independence of "t and the contract positions of bidders is a realistic assumption.
12Hortacsu (2000, 2002) applies this resampling based approach to estimate the distribution of the
market clearing price from the point of view of bidder i in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the
divisible good auction model of treasury bill auctions, under the assumptions 1 and 2, for the case
of deterministic supply. He has proved the consistency of this estimator which resamples from bids
of a single auction. He also shows that the estimator performs well in a Monte-Carlo experiment.
In an extension where he allows supply to be stochastic, he shows that the estimators performs well
with resampling from bid data of a single auction and simulating from an AR(1) t of the supply
data.
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(1) Fix bidder i among the total Nt bidders in auction t
(2) From the sample of Nt bids in the data set, draw a random sample of Nt  1
bid vectors with replacement, each with 1
Nt
probability.
(3) Draw from the distribution of demand (the load) for time t (which can be
estimated using the demand data)
(4) Using the Nt   1 resampled bids and the simulated demand for time t, con-
struct the residual supply function of bidder i
(5) Intersect bidder is bid with the constructed residual demand and nd the
market clearing price.
(6) Repeat steps 2, 3, 4 and 5 B times, to get B market clearing prices for bidder
i.
Then, a simple way to estimate Hit(pjbSit(p); QCit) can be to build the empirical
distribution of the B market clearing prices.
Note that with QCit, i = 1; :::; N independently and identically distributed, and
bids generated by symmetric equilibrium strategies, the bids Sit(p;QCit) will also be
i:i:d. The intuition behind the proof of consistency of this resampling based estimator
is the following: resampling can be seen as a way to make random draws from the
empirical distribution of bid vectors. By Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem, the empirical
distribution converges (almost surely) to the true distribution as the sample size grows
large.
Below are preliminary ndings from application of this resampling based estimator
to three rms in our data set, for non-stochastic demand. Here, demand is taken
as known to all bidders relying on the fact that bidders in the BES market are
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experienced in load forecasting and they have a very precise guess about the load one
hour ahead by looking at the trend of load. Bids are resampled 1000 times.
During the hour depicted in the gures, average load realized as 45; 669 MWs.
Net deployment of BES was 1; 542, 1; 728, 1; 778, 1; 679 MWs for the respective 15
minute intervals. Average BES deployment was 1; 682 MWs. Market was cleared at
$41:16, $47:92, $47:92, $46:38 at the respective15 minute intervals. Average price of
the hour was $45:85.
Figure 4.1. Distribution of resampled market clearing prices and supply
schedule of Brazos - 29 Sep. 2010, 17:00pm
Note that we have found only a nite number of data points at which the market
clears. This is due to the discrete number of price-quantity pairs bidders submit.
Brazos is one of the smaller players in ERCOT market. What we observe from 4.1
is that Brazos has bid on a price range between $10 and $34:3_9. Brazos has almost
only bid to decrease its day ahead scheduled quantity, with only one pair to increase
its generation by 4MWs if the price hits $34:39. It seems that Brazos has bid almost
all its capacity in the day ahead market, and plays to decrease its generation in case
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of a low market clearing price. On the other hand, as per our estimation, it gives
50% chance to price hitting $34:39.
Figure 4.2. Distribution of resampled market clearing prices - Luminant -
29 Sep. 2010, 17:00 pm
Figure 4.3. Luminant Supply Schedule - 29 Sep. 2010, 17:00 pm
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Luminant and NRG are two big players in the market. They have bid for a wide
range of prices and quantities13.
Figure 4.4. Distribution of resampled market clearing prices - NRG - 29
Sep. 2010, 17:00 pm
Figure 4.5. NRG supply schedule - 29 Sep. 2010, 17:00 pm
13We did not include the bids of NRG at prices  $291   $292 and  $293, which were to decrease
its supply by 3061, 3062 and 3063MWs respectively in 4.5, in order to provide a more visible gure
of the rest of the schedule.
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4.5. Analysis of Observed Bid Schedules
4.5.1. Data
In this section we introduce the data used in the analysis of the bidding behavior of
the companies participating in the BES in ERCOT. Among the data available to us
are the individual BES bids, energy schedules of rms at the day ahead market and
the resource plan details of the generation plants on an hourly basis from September
12, 2010 to November 30, 201014. Energy schedules data provides us the quantity of
electricity submitted to be generated by each rm at the day ahead market. Individual
bid data has the bids to increase or decrease the day ahead market quantities in the
real time market. Resource plan details let us know which generation units in a rms
generation eet are available at a specic point in time, their generation capacities
and their planned utilization. Since the method we use to estimate the marginal cost
functions does not require pooling bids from di¤erent hours, we have the opportunity
to work on a single balancing energy auction each time. Therefore, the rst task is
to chose which auction to analyze. While on one hand, working on a single auction
saves us the trouble of controlling for the changing factors from one time period to
the next, on the other hand conclusion of the analysis will be applicable only to the
specic period being analyzed. This also renders the analysis vulnerable to even small
14These data sets have been published on ERCOT website for the past two years, 60 days after the
operating day until the system switched from zonal to nodal on December 1, 2010. After this date,
all the historic data was removed from public availability and no more individual bid data is made
available to public by ERCOT. We thank Ozgur Inal for sharing his compiled data set with us.
102
size anomalies occurring in the ERCOT system. Therefore, it is crucial to choose a
time period which is representative and in which ERCOT functions normally15.
For the purpose of this study, by normal activity of the system we mean mainly
three things: First, there should be no inter-zonal congestion during the time period
we analyze. Congestion of the power lines connecting zones in ERCOT results in
di¤erent market clearing prices in di¤erent zones. We would like to analyze whole
ERCOT region as a single market, hence we looked for the periods in which there
were no inter-zonal congestion16.Second, we would like to capture the behavior of the
bidder rms at the peak demand hours of the day during which the peaker generators
would be on and available to go online instantly. For this, we tried to understand
the peaking times of the day throughout the period for which we have data. It turns
out that during the month of September in 2010, the peak demand mostly occurs on
5 pm. Third, since we do not take into account the start-up and shut-down costs
of the plants while building the variable cost, we would like to look at the periods
during which start-ups and shut-downs do not occur for the plants we analyze. For
this purpose, we check the resource plan details to see which plants are on and o¤ by
period, and chose a period in which on/o¤ status of the plants do not change from
previous to the chosen time period and from chosen to the next time period.
15However, it is always possible to analyze all the auctions, one auction at a time, and interpret the
averaged results, or look at the trend of the statistics throughout time.
16We found the congestion cost information from the Zonal Grid Information Re-
port Archives which are available at http://www.ercot.com/gridinfo/congestion/summary/.
To double check, we also reached the balancing energy services daily reports at
http://ercot.com/mktinfo/services/bal/2010/index and conrmed that market clearing price for en-
ergy is same for all zones implying no congestion. We picked from the days on which there were no
congestion.
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It is possible that a bidder turns into a monopoly in a certain zone due to the
congestion of a grid line connecting that zone to the others. Therefore, bidders can
have signicantly di¤erent strategies when they are in anticipation of a congestion.
Acknowledging this fact, we followed the strategy of Sioshansi and Oren (2007) and
looked for the days congestion did not occur in any of the time periods. We found that
during the one week period from Monday, September 27 to Sunday October 3, there
were no congestion. Hence, we concluded that a one hour period picked from this
week could be a good candidate which would be free from anticipation of congestion.
The peak demand started at around 38; 000MWhs occurring at 5 pm on Monday
September 27, 2010, climbed gradually up to around 46; 000 MWhs at 5 pm on
Thursday, and went down to around 33; 000 MWhs at 5 pm on Sunday. During the
weekdays from Tuesday to Friday, the peak demand varied between 40; 000 and 45; 000
MWhs. We decided that this cluster of days during which there is no congestion and
the peak demand is relatively stable is a good candidate. Finally, we checked the
occurrence of start-up and shut-down of plants for the selected companies for this
time period. It turns out that only very limited number of start-up or shut-downs
have occurred at the beginning and end of the 5 pm period on Wednesday, September
29, 2010. As a result, we chose to study the BES auction which took place at this
specic time and date.
4.5.1.1. Building Cost Functions. We use the resource plan details data to see
which generators of a bidding rm are online at a given time period. We have data
on their hourly available capacity and the day ahead scheduled generation for each
generator in the portfolio of the bidder rms. We assume that the marginal cost
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of a generation unit is constant up to its hourly capacity. To drive each rms cost
function, we assume that it deploys its generation portfolio starting from the generator
with the lowest marginal cost. When nding the variable cost of providing UBES and
DBES generation, wind, hydroelectric and solar plants are assumed to be excluded
from the generation portfolio for strategic bidding. due to the di¢ culty of estimating
their availability.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) s National Electric Energy Data Sys-
tem (NEEDS) v.4.10 has the heat rate, fuel type and SO2 permit rate data for all
the generators. To nd a generators variable cost, we multiply the heat rate of that
generator (Btu/kWh) with the price of the related fuel . We used the average nat-
ural gas price for September 2010 reported in Information Administrations (EIA)
Electric Power Monthly Archives. We follow Hortacsu and Puller (2008) and Oren
and Sioshansi (2007) in adding $0:1=mmBtu for transportation on top of the fuel
price. Subbituminous price for coal plant and cost of uranium for nuclear plants were
retrieved from snl.com.
After nding the fuel cost of the plants we added operating and maintenance
costs17.
Coal red plants in Texas are required to hold federal emission permits for each
ton of SO2 emission. Permit rate (lbs/mmBtu) for each generator is available in
NEEDS v.4.10. We found the permit price ($/ton ) for SO2 at the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)s Emission Allowance Archives.
17We used a report for 2010 dated May, 2011 by the Nuclear Energy Institute (http://www.nei.org/).
Per this report, gas, coal and nuclear plants, have operating and maintenance costs of 23%, 11%
and 70% of total production costs respectively.
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Having calculated the marginal cost functions of bidders, we shift the centers to
the day ahead scheduled quantity to nd variable costs of providing balancing energy
services. This is interpreted as the marginal cost of providing UBES or the cost
savings of providing DBES.
4.5.2. Estimation of the marginal cost functions implied by the model
In order to resample from the pool of bids at the given hour, we rst aggregated
the supply schedules of QSEs for the four di¤erent zones of ERCOT. By this way,
we built the system-wide supply schedule of each QSE which are monotone non-
decreasing step functions of quantity. We have 68 di¤erent QSEs bidding for 5 pm
on September 29, 201018. For each resampling, we drew with replacement 67 bids
each with probability 1
68
. We then aggregated these 67 bids into a non-decreasing
step function. We repeated this procedure 5000 times.
Next, we model the load Lt at hour t using a simple linear model: Lt =  +
Lt 1 + "t where "t  N(0; 2). We chose this autoregressive type model since
a strong determinant of the hourly load is the load level at the previous hour. The
other explanatory variable of common use in load forecasting is the temperature. Also
for long time series data, yearly, seasonally, monthly, weekly, weekend-weekdays and
daily seasonality of the load should be accounted for. We believe bidders participating
in the BES market have such detailed load forecasting tools. However for our purpose,
the simple linear model is su¢ cient.
18However, this number includes several sub-QSEs bearing the same company name. Overall, there
are 39 di¤erent companies.
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We estimated the model with hourly load data between 4:00 to 17:00 during
the weekdays of the week starting with September 27, 2010, which sum up to 65
observations. During these portions of the days we chose, the load has an increasing
pattern. The estimate of the coe¢ cients are (b; b; b2) = (1023:3; 1:0137; 786:4). The
predicted load for the hour we study (17:00 on Wednesday, September 29,2010) is
46; 160 MWs. Realized load at this hour is 45; 669 MWs.
For each of the 5000 resampled aggregate bids of others, we also took a random
draw from the estimated distribution of the error term and added this noise to the
predicted level of the load. So we obtained one simulated load level for each resam-
pling. We know from ERCOT that aggregate day ahead scheduled generation at this
hour was 43; 937 MWs. We subtract this quantity from the simulated load levels to
nd the simulated net BES demands. We subtract the aggregated 67 bid schedules
from the simulated BES demands to get 5000 simulated residual BES demands in
the form of non-increasing step functions. Figure 4.6 is a depiction of 100 simulated
residual BES demands together with the supply schedule of Luminant.
Next, we nd the simulated market clearing prices at the intersection of the sup-
ply schedule of the bidder we are interested in with each of the simulated residual
demands. Since we have discrete data points for the supply schedules and the residual
demands, we interpolate both of these to nd the values at a ner grid. This way, we
get a smoother estimate of the Hi(pjSi(p); QCi), belief of bidder i about the market
clearing price distribution.
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Figure 4.6. Simulated residual demands
Previous studies of ERCOTs BES market show that larger participants in the
market come closer to the optimal strategies implied by a prot maximization as-
sumption. Hence, we estimate the market clearing price distributions H for the three
largest companies bidding at the BES market: Luminant, NRG and Calpine.
We estimate H non-parametrically with a normal kernel. For all the companies,
we choose the smallest window width that gives a non-zero estimate for Hp (since
it is in the denominator in Equation 4.2) for all the price levels that company has
bid for. (selected window widths are 15, 10 and 20 for Luminant, NRG and Calpine
respectively)
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the non-parametric estimates of the believes of three
big companies regarding the distribution and density of the market clearing price,
conditional on their own contract quantity and bid.
Finally, to estimate HS, we shift the supply schedules S(p) of the three companies
by 20 MWs in a range of  200 and +200 MWs around their true position. For each
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Figure 4.7. Estimated distribution of market clearing price for three
large companies
Figure 4.8. Estimated densities of market clearing price for three large companies
of the shifted supply schedules we nd the new intersections with the 5000 simulated
residual BES demand, then estimate H using the 5000 market clearing prices. In
other words for each shift, we re-estimate H. Then, at a given price level p, we look
at how much a shift in S(p) has changed H(p):
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For a given company, we regress the values of H(p) for shifted supply schedules on
a constant and a vector of shift quantities ( 200; 180; 160; :::; 0; :::; 160; 180; 200·).
The estimated slope parameter of this linear t is our estimate for HS(p) 19. Figure
4.9 depicts the estimated values of H(45) (the average market clearing price occurred
as $45:85 during the hour) for the original and shifted supply schedules of Luminant,
NRG and Calpine. (shift quantity being zero represents the original supply schedule
of the company).
Figure 4.9. HS(p) at p = $45: Luminant, NRG and Calpine
Regression analysis reveals that at the market clearing price p = $45, Luminant,
NRG and Calpine have close estimates of HS(p): 2:25e   04, 2:6e   04, 2:15e   04
respectively. HS(p) is the ability of a bidder to manipulate the distribution of market
clearing price by changing its supply. Therefore, as has also been argued by Hortacsu
19Looking at the gures, it is obvious that these points have a linear pattern for the given price
levels.
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and Puller (2008), this term captures the market power of the bidder. Estimated
numbers say that NRG has the highest HS around the real market clearing price at
the 5 pm auction on 29 September 2010, while Calpine has the lowest. On the other
hand, at price $200, Luminant has the highest and NRG has the lowest HS with the
estimates 1:9e  04, 1:13e  04 and 0:52e  04 in decreasing order.
Figure 4.10. HS(p) at p = $200: Luminant, NRG, Calpine
At both price levels, the distributions increase as the supply schedules of the
bidders are shifted to the right. This is expected, since increasing the supply at every
price level (i.e. shifting the supply curve to the right) can only weakly decrease the
market clearing price, hence increase its distribution. (HS(p) is always non-negative
for all bidders, for all p)
Moreover, note that HS(p:S(p))
Hp(p;S(p))
=
@H
@p
 @p
@S
@H
@p
= @p
@S
. Hence, the ratio can be interpreted
as the ability of a bidder to change the market clearing price by changing its supply.
The estimates of this ratio for the price level p = 45 are 0:0134, 0:0087 and 0:015
111
for Luminant, NRG and Calpine respectively. For p = 200 the estimates are 9:3243,
1:49e+ 011, and 4:5834 for the same order of the three bidders. We observe that all
the bidders have much higher ability to change the market clearing price at the high
price level p = 200. This is expected as the bidders have bid much steeper supply
schedules for the prices around $200, while they have bid almost horizontal around
p = 45. (This is called hockey-stick bidding).
Finally, we plug estimatedHS(p) andHp(p) in the markup expression derived from
the rst order optimality condition Equation 4.2, together with the price-quantity
(p; Si (p)) pairs bid by the three bidders we are interested in:
p  C 0i(Si (p)) = (Si (p) QCi)
Hs(pjSi (p); QCi)
Hp(pjSi (p); QCi)
We solve for the marginal cost C
0
i(S

i (p)) of generating S

i (p) for all p that exists
in the supply schedule of bidder i. Results for the three bidders can be seen in gures
4.11 to4.15.
4.5.2.1. Discussion of the estimation results. Figures 4.11 to 4.15 depict the
bids, estimated marginal costs and actual marginal costs of the three largest bidders,
Luminant, NRG and Calpine, in BES market. One thing that is easy to notice is that
the estimated marginal costs are not necessarily non-decreasing. This is a result of
not imposing any functional form or structure on the supply schedules.
Next, note that the magnitude of the positive markup to the right of the contract
quantity (and the mark-down to the left) depends on the di¤erence of the quantity
bid at that price with the contract quantity level (i.e. long or short position), and
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Figure 4.11. Luminants bid, estimated MC and actual MC
the HS
Hp
ratio. So, the bidder puts a higher markup on its cost when it has exceeded
its contracted quantity level, and when HS is higher. As we have discussed earlier
that the term HS captures the market power of the rm, we can say that equilibrium
strategies of the model take into account market power of bidders.
Figure 4.11 depicts Luminants estimated MC for QC=0. Figure 4.12 gives the
estimated MC for several di¤erent assumed QC levels. This demonstrates how the
choice of the contract quantity changes the estimated markup. As implied by the
First order condition in equation 4.2, the assumed contract quantity level determines
the point of intersection of the estimated marginal cost and the supply schedule of
the bidder.
Focusing only on two contract quantity levels, QC = 0, which is the level assumed
at the beginning of the study, and QC = 166 which is implied by the actual cost, we
see that at the realized market clearing price, the 0 contract quantity level implies
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Figure 4.12. Luminants bid, actual MC and estimated MC for di¤erent QCs
a small prot, while the other one implies that the generator just covers its cost.
However, since these contract levels are close to each other, the general look of the
markups and markdowns do not di¤er a lot. We estimate a negative mark-up around
$20-$25, that diminishes to zero at the contract quantity level. On the long position
side we estimate a positive markup aroud $25-$30. However, the actual cost implies
mark downs as large as double the magnitude of the mark-downs implied by the
estimated cost. And on the mark-up side, actual cost implies close to ten times the
estimated mark-up.
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Figure 4.13. NRGs bid, estimated MC and actual MC
Figure 4.14. NRGs bid, estimated MC and actual MC: QC=678 MWs
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 give two estimates of the implied marginal cost for NRG
for the cases of day ahead schedule exactly covering the contract quantity, and of day
ahead schedules being 678 MWs short of contract quantity respectively. 678 MW
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Figure 4.15. Calpines bid, estimated MC and actual MC
is the quantity where NRGs supply schedule. intersects with its actual marginal
cost. This is the contract quantity level implied by Hortacsu and Pullers behavioral
assumption deduced from the rst order optimality condition in Equation 4.2: rms
bid lower than their marginal cost for the quantities which still are not enough to cover
their contract quantity, and they bid with a positive markup for the quantities above
their contract quantity, and nally, they bid their marginal cost for the quantity
that exactly covers their contract level. As can be observed from the two gures,
assuming a contract quantity of 678 MW results in a marginal cost estimate which is
more comparable with the actual marginal cost. Although our purpose in this study
is to nd the marginal costs implied by the model, the cost built on the heat rate and
fuel type information can be taken as the actual cost.
On the side where the bidder is short of its contract quantity, taking the contract
quantity level implied by the actual cost, we estimate a mark-down starting from
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around $15 and diminishing to zero at the contract quantity level. On the side where
NRG is bidding for more than its contracted quantity, we estimate a markup around
$10-$15 on top of its marginal cost.
However, when we compare these estimated markups with the markups implied by
actual costs, actual cost implies greater markups (in absolute value) The magnitude
of the actual markup and markdowns can go up to 6-8 times the estimated ones.
Therefore, at the auction we analyze, both Luminant and NRG have larger mark-
downs and markups than the optimal levels implied by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
of the multi-unit auction model of the BES market.
Calpine is the smallest of the three rms we are analyzing. It also has the least
number of price-quantitiy pairs in its supply schedule for the period we look at. The
estimated cost of Calpine shows a dramatic level of non-monotonic behavior, mostly
due to the few price-quantity pairs in its submitted supply schedule. Calpines actual
cost intersects its supply schedule at quantity 0, hence implying a 0 contract quantity.
For this level of the contract quantity gure 4.15 shows that on the negative side,
Calpine has an estimated mark-down of close to $7 on average. On the positive side,
we estimate varying levels of mark-up from $0 to $20, increasing with the quantity.
But the general trend of estimated cost is similar to the other two. When we look
at the actual cost, on the negative side it implies a mark-down around $30, which
is 4 to 5 times higher than the estimated one. On the positive side, the actual cost
generally follows the estimated cost very closely. However, as not seen with the other
two rms, actual markup is smaller than the estimated markup for some quantity
levels. The average di¤erence between the actual and estimated markup for Calpine
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is around $5, which makes Calpine the bidder coming closest to bidding the optimal
implied by the model.
4.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we estimated the costs in a multi-unit auction model of the BES. In
doing so, we wanted to improve the model of Hortacsu and Puller (2008) by removing
the restrictive a priori assumption of additive separability of the supply schedules
with respect to the private information of bidders. We also tried to draw attention
to the identication of contract quantities and how it changes the interpretation of
ndings. We found that, although not necessarily non-decreasing, the marginal cost
functions implied by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model
of the BES are informative about the actual cost levels.
The non-parametric resampling based estimator we used in this study does not
require us to pool data from di¤erent auctions. This saves us having to control for
covariates and worry about possible unobserved heterogeneity, which could render
our estimator biased.
In summary, we nd that, for the BES auction we study, the three largest bidders,
Luminant, NRG and Calpine, have marked-down their bids more than the optimal
amount implied by the model for the quantities where they were short of their con-
tractual obligations, while they have put a mark-up larger than the optimal level
implied by the model for quantities in excess of their contract obligations. Among
the three bidders we studied, Calpine has come closest to bidding its optimal implied
by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the multi-unit auction model of the BES market.
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